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 Abstract 
We identify the power of institutional blockholders to influence management 
using previous occurrences of forced CEO turnover at other firms in the 
blockholders’ overall portfolio. We create a “powerful blockholder linkage” 
measure that strongly predicts future forced CEO turnover. These effects are 
larger when “powerful” blockholders are more motivated to monitor and when 
they have had valuable monitoring experience. Moreover, firms with powerful 
blockholders display higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, pursue more 
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1 Introduction 
It is widely argued that prominent shareholders – often called blockholders – should be 
important monitors of corporate managers.1 However, the extent of blockholder influence 
and power over management remains difficult to empirically quantify. For example, the 
decision to dismiss a CEO is an important disciplinary governance outcome (e.g., Kang 
and Shivdasani, 1995; Huson, Parrino, and Starks, 2001). Yet, empirical evidence on the 
relation between blockholders and CEO turnover is inconclusive. Denis, Denis, and Sarin 
(1997) find some evidence that blockholders are associated with CEO dismissal while 
Kaplan and Minton (2012) find no effects of blockholder ownership on forced CEO 
turnover. 
 One possible reason for this lack of clear empirical evidence is the heterogeneity 
among blockholders. Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) find that blockholders differ in 
their preferences, skills, experiences, and governing styles. Another important reason is 
that shareholder power and influence are difficult to observe, particularly when large 
institutional investors tend to intervene “behind the scenes” (McCahery, Sautner, and 
Starks, 2015) or threaten to exit if management performs poorly (Admati and Pfleiderer, 
2009; Edmans, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 2011).2 In either case, the private nature of 
large shareholder intervention makes it difficult to assess the impact of these 
mechanisms. 
In this paper, we propose a technique to extract the power and influence of 
institutional blockholders. Our approach is based on the idea that “powerful” 
blockholders should have a proven track record of achieving influential governance 
outcomes – such as forced CEO turnover – in their portfolio companies. By chance, an 
institutional investor may be a blockholder in a firm with forced CEO turnover. 
However, serving as a blockholder in multiple companies that undergo forced CEO 
turnover is unlikely to be mere coincidence. Therefore, a strong track record is likely to 
reflect an institutional blockholder’s governance ability and monitoring style. We 
                                            
1 See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Kahn and Winton (1998), and Maug (1998). 
2 Also see, for example, Smith (1996), Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998), Becht, Franks, Mayer, and 
Rossi (2009), and Dimson, Karakas, and Li (2015). 
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hypothesize that powerful blockholders are likely to influence future governance 
outcomes of their portfolio companies.  
To identify powerful blockholders, we focus on institutional blockholders with 
holdings greater than 5 percent of the firm’s shares outstanding. Then, we classify an 
institutional blockholder as “powerful” if its portfolio contains a high proportion of 
blockholdings with forced CEO turnover.3 Specifically, we define a powerful blockholder 
linkage measure as the fraction of blockholder holdings that are held by powerful 
blockholders. We test our hypothesis by examining the relation between powerful 
blockholder linkage and future CEO turnover as well as other governance outcomes.  
As a direct validation of our identification of powerful blockholders, we examine 
their voting records in director elections. Their opposition to director nominations 
should provide a window into their willingness to intervene, even when intervention may 
reduce business opportunities and access to management.4 Based on mutual fund voting 
data, we find that powerful blockholders are less likely to vote “For” on director elections 
than other blockholders. For example, the average fraction of “For” votes in excess of the 
overall vote outcome is -7.5% for powerful blockholders versus -3.3% for other 
blockholders. The difference in voting is highly statistically significant between the two 
groups of investors. Further analysis shows that this pattern is stronger for director 
election proposals with a “For” recommendation from Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS) than for the ones with an “Against” or “Withhold” recommendation. This indicates 
that powerful blockholders are also less likely to follow the recommendations of proxy 
advisors than other blockholders.5 Moreover, these patterns persist among the “in-
sample” stocks (i.e., stocks with available information on forced CEO turnover), as well 
as among the “out-of-sample” stocks (i.e., stocks which we do not use to identify 
powerful blockholders due to a lack of CEO turnover data). This evidence suggests that 
                                            
3 We choose various cutoffs to represent a “high” fraction of holdings in forced CEO turnover stocks. Our 
results are robust to the choice of these cutoffs, which we discuss in detail in later analyses.  
4 See Davis and Kim (2007), Ashraf, Jayaraman, and Ryan (2012), and Butler and Gurun (2012). 
5 Our results are consistent with Aggarwal, Erel, and Starks (2015) and Iliev and Lowry (2015) that proxy 
voters do not uniformly follow the recommendations of proxy advisors. We show that powerful 
blockholders are more likely to be such voters.  
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our approach represents a reasonable and robust strategy to identify blockholder power 
and influence in their governance roles. 
Our main analysis examines the effect of powerful blockholders on future CEO 
turnover. The evidence indicates that the powerful blockholder linkage measure strongly 
predicts CEO dismissal decisions in the following year. Results from a probit regression 
indicate that a one standard deviation increase in powerful blockholder linkage increases 
the probability of a forced CEO turnover by 21% relative to the sample average 
probability. Conversely, our tests show that powerful blockholders have no effect on the 
probability of voluntary CEO turnover, as these CEOs likely depart for non-governance 
related reasons. 
An alternative interpretation is that other underlying commonalities among firms 
that share common ownership by powerful blockholders drive the CEO dismissal 
decision. For example, firms linked by common blockholders may have interlocking 
board relationships. Also, they may share underlying economic links such as: 1) the 
same industry membership, 2) the same regional location, or 3) supply chain 
relationships. Therefore, we reconstruct the powerful blockholder linkage measure after 
excluding firms that share these potential economic links. The evidence suggests that 
these commonalities are not behind our findings as our results are not sensitive to these 
alternative specifications. 
To develop a better understanding of the influence of powerful blockholders, we 
carefully analyze their incentives, governing style, and past experience. Previous studies 
find that the incentive to monitor increases with ownership (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986; Fich, Harford, and Tran, 2015). This suggests that relatively small investors are 
unlikely to have incentives to actively monitor and exert influence on management. 
Additionally, institutional blockholders may have banking or other business relationships 
(i.e., “grey” or “pressure sensitive” investors) with their portfolio companies, limiting 
their incentives to intervene in management activity (e.g., Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 
1988; Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks, 2005; Borokhovich et al., 2006). Also, investment 
style may affect the likelihood of intervention as investors with longer holding horizons 
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are more likely to monitor (e.g., Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007). Therefore, we reconstruct 
the powerful blockholder linkage measure separately by each investor classification group 
and examine whether powerful blockholder influence is associated with investor 
characteristics. 
The evidence suggests that the linkage effects of powerful blockholders reside 
mainly among investors with strong ex-ante monitoring incentives and interventionist 
styles. First, we find that shareholder linkages based on non-blockholders have no ability 
to predict future forced CEO turnovers. Second, the ability to dismiss CEOs resides only 
among powerful blockholders that are “independent” institutions and is not present 
among those that are “grey” institutions. Third, powerful blockholders with longer 
holding horizons affect the CEO dismissal decision, while short-horizon investors do not. 
These findings are consistent with the shareholder monitoring channel in previous 
studies. However, it is important to note that our findings are not simply re-
documenting prior evidence. Rather, our tests provide a within classification group 
comparison, which indicates significant heterogeneity among “independent” and long-
horizon blockholders in their ability and power to exert influence over management. 
Our findings also suggest that past monitoring experience plays an important role 
in powerful blockholder influence. Firing CEOs may require careful shareholder 
coordination, boardroom restructuring, and CEO succession planning. For example, in a 
survey of large institutional investors (McCahery, Sautner, and Starks, 2015), 45% of 
respondents had private discussion with the company’s board outside of management’s 
presence in the past five years. We hypothesize that powerful blockholders are more 
likely to develop and learn valuable skills and knowledge during the experience of 
unseating “difficult-to-dismiss” CEOs. Consistent with this experience channel, the 
evidence suggests that the probability of CEO dismissal is associated with the powerful 
blockholders’ experience of firing long tenured CEOs, firing chairman CEOs, or firing 
CEOs when the industry is performing relatively well. 
Thus far, our analysis is focused on establishing the influence of powerful 
blockholders on CEO turnover. But it remains an open question whether their ability 
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reflects good governance or a style of monitoring that (inefficiently) fires CEOs. This is 
a concern because if these shareholders are uninformed, it may be necessary to protect 
managers from reckless intervention (Fisman, Khurana, Rhodes-Kropf, and Yim, 2014). 
To understand whether powerful blockholders are good monitors, we examine whether 
they affect other corporate governance outcomes. 
We first examine CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. Previous studies show that 
greater CEO turnover-performance sensitivity may be an indication of better corporate 
governance (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; Denis and Denis, 1995). Our evidence suggests that 
CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is greater in firms with higher powerful 
blockholder linkages. Second, we examine the market reaction to bidder announcement. 
Mergers and acquisitions represent an important governance outcome because these 
decisions may create significant conflicts between the interests of shareholders and 
managers (e.g., Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007). Consistent with good governance, the 
results indicate that bidder announcement returns are significantly higher among firms 
with greater powerful blockholder linkages. Third, efficient monitoring should be 
associated with higher firm value. We find that firms with higher powerful blockholder 
linkages have higher firm valuation. 
We provide a series of robustness tests to ensure that our findings are not sensitive 
to our methodological choices. We find that our results are robust when creating the 
powerful blockholder linkage measure using the top 5 largest institutional shareholders 
or using various cut-offs to identify powerful blockholders. Our results are also similar 
after controlling for additional board characteristics and other governance 
characteristics, such as board structure, director compensation, director characteristics, 
and takeover provisions (e.g. Weisbach, 1988; Kaplan and Minton, 1994; Kang and 
Shivdasani, 1995; Mobbs, 2013; Mikkelson and Partch, 1997). Our findings are also 
unchanged after controlling for blockholder concentration and busyness. 
While we address a number of potential alternative explanations, we recognize the 
possibility of an unobserved omitted variable lingering behind our findings. Our powerful 
blockholder linkage measure is based on the portfolio choice of powerful blockholders 
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vis-à-vis other institutional blockholders, which may be endogenously determined by 
some unobserved firm characteristics. However, we argue that this endogeneity concern 
should be alleviated based on three considerations. 
First, the identification of powerful blockholders relies on the occurrences of forced 
CEO turnovers in other companies, which are unlikely to reflect an endogenous firm 
choice. Also, we show that alternative economic linkages across these firms are not 
driving our results. Second, compared to smaller shareholders, institutional blockholders, 
on average, should have relatively homogenous investment mandates, liquidity 
preferences, or diversification needs, but may be heterogeneous in their monitoring style 
and governance ability. To capture this heterogeneity, our powerful blockholder linkage 
measure characterizes the representation of powerful blockholders amongst institutional 
blockholders. Third, reassuringly, there is little correlation between the powerful 
blockholder linkage variable and other investor ownership characteristics or major firm 
characteristics with a correlation coefficient always less than 0.1, suggesting that it is 
unlikely to be endogenously driven by an omitted firm variable that strongly affects 
CEO dismissal decisions. 
Nonetheless, to further address the endogeneity concerns, we provide a set of 
falsifications tests. We expect that any possible, unaddressed omitted variable that 
correlates with blockholder linkages based on forced CEO turnover is likely also related 
to blockholder linkages based on voluntary CEO turnover. However, as previously 
explained, the power and influence of blockholders are reflected only through forced 
CEO turnover, but not through voluntary CEO turnover. Therefore, we create a 
“placebo” test using a similar measure of blockholder linkage with other firms that have 
voluntary CEO turnover. We re-estimate all of our key findings in this study using this 
variable and find that it is unrelated to any of our previous findings.  
Our study contributes to several different strands of literature. First, our findings 
are consistent with recent survey evidence on the widespread use of “behind-the-scenes” 
engagement by large institutional investors (McCahery, Sautner, and Starks, 2015). We 
provide new empirical evidence that the “track record” of a prominent governance 
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outcome (i.e., forced CEO turnover) embeds institutional blockholders’ governance 
preferences and monitoring abilities. Consistent with McCahery, Sautner, and Starks 
(2015), this suggests that an identifiable group of large institutional investors are more 
active and influential than what can be inferred from aggregate ownership data alone. 
Also, we contribute to a literature on the governance role of large institutional investors. 
Recent studies focus on the intervening activities of some institutional investors such as 
activist hedge funds (e.g., Brav, Jiang, and Kim, 2010). However, hedge funds are in 
general much smaller than institutional blockholders in terms of ownership stakes. We 
provide a more generalized view on the governance outcome of large institutional 
investors. 
Second, our findings contribute to a large literature that uses broad-based 
shareholder characteristics to uncover the monitoring incentives of institutional investors 
(e.g., Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1988; Bushee, 2001; Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007). We 
extend this literature in three ways. To our knowledge, we are the first to propose that 
an investor’s track record of prominent governance outcomes in the portfolio companies 
provides important clues on their monitoring ability. Second, this approach provides a 
parsimonious method of identifying shareholder influence within broad-based 
shareholder classifications. Identifying a group of powerful blockholders allows us to 
create sharper tests and draw stronger inferences across multiple governance outcomes. 
Third, our approach potentially identifies a clear set of blockholders that wield 
considerable influence and power in the corporate boardrooms. 
Our results also contribute to a literature examining how blockholders affect 
corporate outcomes (e.g., Holderness, 2003). Kang and Kim (2006) find that the 
presence of local blockholders improves the quality of mergers and acquisitions. 
Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) show that blockholder styles affect investment, 
financial leverage, and executive compensation. Our study extends this line of research 
by showing that a group of blockholders identified as powerful have significant influence 
on CEO dismissal and other governance outcomes.  
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Importantly, our results provide a potential resolution to the mixed evidence 
surrounding the effect of blockholders on CEO turnover. Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) 
find limited evidence that blockholders are associated with CEO dismissal while Kaplan 
and Minton (2012) find no effects of blockholder ownership on forced CEO turnover. 
Consistent with these studies, we also find that blockholder ownership is an insignificant 
predictor of forced CEO turnover in our tests. However, the powerful blockholder linkage 
measure strongly predicts forced CEO turnover, highlighting the importance of isolating 
heterogeneity among blockholders. 
Finally, we add to a growing literature on the effects of common shareholder 
linkages. Previous studies focus on the spillover effects of common shareholder linkages 
on stock price co-movement and liquidity (Greenwood and Thesmar, 2011; Anton and 
Polk, 2014; Bartram, et al, 2015). To our knowledge, we are the first to show that 
institutional blockholder linkages affect prominent corporate governance outcomes such 
as CEO turnover across different firms. 
2 Data and Variables 
2.1 Data 
The data on CEO turnover, including both forced turnover and voluntary turnover, for 
all firms in the S&P ExecuComp database during the period of 1993 to 2010 is from 
Jenter and Kanaan (2015) and Peters and Wagner (2014). 6  The data on CEO 
characteristics is obtained from ExecuComp. Information on the board of directors is 
from the IRRC Riskmetrics database. Mutual fund voting data from 2003-2008 is from 
the ISS Voting Analytics database. We collect quarterly equity holdings data of 
institutional investors from Thomson 13F filings. 7  Investor style (transient, non-
transient) and investor types (banks, insurance companies, investment companies, 
investment advisors, and others) are based on classifications available on Brian Bushee’s 
                                            
6 We thank Dirk Jenter for generously providing this data. 
7 The SEC requires that all institutional investment managers with investment discretion over $100 million 
in 13(f) securities report holdings positions each quarter. 
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website.8 Stock return and accounting data from CRSP and COMPUSTAT are used to 
construct firm level variables including size, market-to-book, book leverage, profitability, 
cash holdings, ILLIQ, and stock return volatility. Detailed descriptions of all these 
variables are provided in the Appendix. 
2.2 Identification of Powerful Blockholders 
We identify powerful blockholders as follows. We start by identifying institutional 
blockholders as institutional investors with greater than 5% ownership in a company’s 
common stock. In each year t, we select firms from the ExecuComp universe that 
experienced a forced CEO turnover during the year and determine the institutional 
blockholders in these firms. For each blockholder, we calculate the fraction of holdings in 
“forced CEO turnover” stocks in its overall portfolio. Among blockholders with at least 
one block position in a “forced CEO turnover” stock, we classify a blockholder as 
“powerful” if its fraction of holdings of “forced CEO turnover” stocks in its portfolio is 
above the bottom tercile of these blockholders. We use the bottom tercile as a cutoff 
point to ensure that we do not inadvertently misclassify blockholders that simply by 
chance held a block in a firm that experienced a forced CEO turnover. As there is no 
theoretical guidance on this empirical decision, in later analyses we identify powerful 
blockholders using the median and first quintile as alternative cutoff points and find 
consistent results. 
 As we focus on examining firm-level governance outcomes, we develop a powerful 
blockholder linkage measure to represent the influence and power among each firm’s 
blockholders, as revealed through their portfolio record of forced CEO turnover in other 
firms. For each firm i without any forced CEO turnovers during year t, we calculate the 
fraction of block holdings that are held by powerful blockholders among the institutional 
blockholders of firm i. Specifically, for firm i at quarter s, the powerful blockholder 
linkage measure is defined as: 
                                            
8 The data are available at http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html. 
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, =
i, j,s
j  Powerful Blockholder  among Institutional Blockholders
i s
i, j,s
j  Institutional Blockholders
H
Powerful Blockholder  Linkage
H




 , 
where Hi,j,s is the institutional holdings of stock i by investor j. Since 13f data is 
reported quarterly, we use the average across the four quarters to create an annual 
powerful blockholder linkage as our main measure in later analyses. 
 The powerful blockholder linkage measure represents the fraction of block holdings 
held by powerful blockholders. We choose the fraction definition for the following 
reasons. First, it captures heterogeneity in terms of governing abilities and styles within 
the group of investors with the greatest ex-ante incentives to govern based on their large 
ownership stakes. Second, variables such as total institutional ownership or institutional 
block ownership (i.e., defined as a percentage of common shares outstanding) tend to be 
endogenously determined by other firm characteristics (e.g., Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1985). As a whole, institutional blockholders should have relatively 
homogenous investment mandates, liquidity preferences, and diversification needs, but 
may have heterogeneous monitoring styles and abilities. This suggests that the fraction 
of powerful blockholders amongst institutional blockholders is less likely to be 
endogenously determined by other firm characteristics. To verify, we find low 
correlations between the powerful blockholder linkage variable and other investor 
ownership characteristics or major firm characteristics. For example, the correlation 
coefficient between powerful blockholder linkage and institutional block ownership is 0% 
in our sample. Therefore, the fraction of powerful blockholders may provide direct 
information on the ability of the blockholder group to intervene. In our empirical tests, 
we always control for the overall level and change in institutional block ownership while 
analyzing the importance of the powerful blockholder linkage measure. In robustness 
tests, we also control for blockholder concentration and busyness. 
We also create additional powerful blockholder linkage measures to ensure that our 
results are robust. First, we follow the same procedure as above to calculate the measure 
of powerful blockholder linkage, but define a blockholder if its ownership is above 1% of 
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the firm’s share outstanding or if they are among the top 5 largest institutional 
investors. Second, to ensure that industry or regional effects are not behind our results, 
we calculate alternative measures of powerful blockholder linkage by excluding forced 
CEO turnover stocks from the same industry or the same geographical region. Third, we 
separately calculate powerful blockholder linkage measures for “independent” investors 
(i.e., investment companies, independent investment advisors, and public pension funds) 
and “grey” investors (i.e., bank trusts, insurance companies, corporate pension funds, 
and other institutions) as well as investors with long- and short- holding horizons. 
2.3 Summary Statistics 
Table I summarizes our overall sample. About 2.4% of sample firms have forced CEO 
turnovers, while 3.5% have voluntary CEO turnovers. Using the 5% ownership cutoff to 
define blockholders, the powerful blockholder linkage measure is around 22% for the 
average firm, with a standard deviation of 26%. This indicates that 22% of 
blockholdings are held by “powerful” blockholders under this specification. Using the 1% 
ownership cutoff definition, this percentage increases to around 38%. Using the top 5 
institutional investor definition, around 26% of the top 5 institutional investors are 
designated as “powerful” by our methodology for the average firm in our sample. 
 Table II reports the summary statistics for powerful blockholders. Panel A presents 
the size of portfolio holdings of institutional blockholders. An institutional blockholder is 
defined as an investor that owns a 5% stake in at least one of its portfolio companies. 
The first row shows that the average institutional blockholder has $3,312 million in 
equity portfolio holdings of which 3.0% of their portfolio companies experience a forced 
CEO turnover event. This is roughly similar to the fraction of firms experiencing forced 
CEO turnover in our sample of stocks. 
 The second row shows that institutional blockholders with at least one forced CEO 
turnover event in the past year manage larger portfolios in terms of dollar holdings. The 
final column shows that these large blockholders are around 13.6% of all institutional 
blockholders (3,450 out of 25,305 investor-quarter observations). Next, we split these 
institutional blockholders into “powerful” and “other” blockholders to ensure that we are 
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not mis-classifying certain blockholders that by chance hold a block in a firm that 
experiences a forced CEO turnover. We define “other” blockholders as those blockholders 
whose fraction of portfolio holdings of forced CEO stocks is in the bottom tercile.9 By 
this classification, the third row shows that powerful blockholders hold much more 
forced CEO turnover stocks than other blockholders. The fraction of holdings in forced 
CEO turnover stocks of other blockholders is reasonably low (1.6% on average). This 
suggests that the tercile cutoff is a reasonable approach to addressing the possibility of 
misclassifying these blockholders as powerful.10 
Panel B of Table II reports the correlation between the powerful blockholder linkage 
measure and firm characteristics. Since our analysis is focused on the stock level, it is 
important to understand whether the measure is strongly related to firm characteristics. 
The correlations suggest that this is not a concern. The correlations are less than 0.1 
with all the major firm characteristics including potential determinants of CEO turnover 
such as institutional ownership, firm size, profitability, past return, etc. 
2.4 Voting Records in Director Elections 
As a direct validation of our identification of powerful blockholders, we examine 
their voting records in director elections. We provide an analysis of the voting records 
by powerful blockholders and by the rest of the institutional blockholders. We obtain a 
sample of mutual fund voting data from ISS Voting Analytics from 2003 to 2008 and 
aggregate the voting data at the institutional investor level. First, for each institution-
stock-quarter, we calculate the average fraction of “For” votes among total votes by the 
investor across different director proposals of the stock. We also calculate an excess 
fraction as the difference between the investor’s fraction of “For” votes and the overall 
                                            
9 As mentioned before, we perform our full set of analysis using the bottom quartile and median cutoff to 
ensure our results are not sensitive to this definition. We report these findings and additional robustness 
tests in Table IX. 
10 In the Internet Appendix, we report examples of institutional blockholders that are “powerful” as 
defined by our criteria. We list the top 40 powerful institutional blockholders ranked by the fraction of 
forced CEO turnover stocks (time-series median). A number of notable institutional investors appear on 
the list including Blackrock, Goldman Sachs, and Berkshire Hathaway. Some large mutual fund families 
are on the list (American Express Financial Advisors, Janus Capital Management, Invesco Capital 
Management). A few hedge funds also make the list including Jeffrey Gendell, Rutabaga Capital, and 
Sterling Capital. 
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fraction of “For” votes among all investors. Then, for each investor-quarter, we calculate 
the average (excess) fraction of “For” votes across different stocks in its portfolio. We 
perform both t-tests and Wilcoxon tests to compare the voting differences between 
powerful blockholders and other blockholders. 
In addition, we separately report the results for director election proposals with and 
without “For” recommendations from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). We also 
provide both an “in-sample” analysis on director elections of stocks covered in the 
ExecuComp database and an “out-of-sample” analysis on director elections of stocks not 
covered in ExecuComp (i.e, stocks not included to identify powerful blockholders). 
Table III presents the results. Panel A shows that powerful blockholders are less 
likely to vote “For” on director elections than other blockholders. The average fraction of 
“For” votes by powerful blockholders in excess of the overall vote outcome is -7.5% 
versus -3.3% by other blockholders. The voting difference between the two groups of 
investors is highly statistically significant. Importantly, this pattern is stronger for 
director election proposals with a “For” recommendation from ISS than for the ones with 
an “Against” or “Withhold” recommendation. This indicates that powerful blockholders 
are more likely to make their own voting decisions, consistent with active monitoring. 
Moreover, Panel B shows that these results persist among “in-sample” stocks and 
“out-of-sample” stocks. Interestingly, the results are even stronger for “out-of-sample” 
stocks,11 which is intuitive considering that the non-ExecuComp stocks are relatively 
smaller and powerful blockholders may have larger influence. This suggests that our 
identification of powerful blockholders is unlikely to be driven by any “within-sample” 
selection bias, but rather represents a valid strategy to identify blockholder power and 
influence in their governance roles. 
 
 
                                            
11 For the “out-of-sample” stocks, the average fraction of “For” votes in excess of overall voting outcome is -
13% by powerful blockholders, compared to that of -5% by other blockholders. 
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3 Powerful Blockholders and CEO Turnover 
This section examines the effect of powerful blockholders on CEO turnover. We focus 
primarily on forced CEO turnover because these dismissals represent influential 
governance actions, but we also examine voluntary CEO turnover to assess both the 
classification of CEO turnover and the powerful blockholder linkage measure. 
3.1 Predicting Forced CEO Turnover 
To examine the effect of powerful blockholders on the probability of forced CEO 
turnover, we estimate the following probit model in equation (1):  
, 1 , , , 1i t i t i t i tForced CEO Turnover α β Powerful blockholder linkage δ X ε        (1)
where Forced CEO Turnover is equal to 1 if the firm experiences a forced CEO turnover 
in year t+1. Powerful blockholder linkagei,t is defined as the fraction of holdings by 
powerful blockholders among the firm’s blockholders, and Xi,t is a vector representing 
firm control variables estimated in year t. All specifications include year fixed effects to 
capture time-varying macroeconomic trends and cluster standard errors at the firm 
level. 
 The evidence suggests that powerful blockholder linkages strongly forecast future 
forced CEO turnover. Table IV reports the regression results. Column (1) shows that 
the Powerful blockholder linkage measure significantly predicts the probability of a 
forced CEO turnover in the following year at the 1% confidence level. As reported in the 
bottom row, the conditional marginal effect implies that a one standard deviation 
increase in the powerful blockholder linkage measure increases the probability of forced 
CEO turnover by 21% relative to the sample average probability. This large economic 
magnitude suggests that the presence of powerful blockholders reflects important 
information on a company’s future forced CEO turnover. The estimates on the control 
variables also show that older, founder, chairman CEOs are less likely to be dismissed. 
This is consistent with prior findings in the literature.12 Also, CEOs with more share 
                                            
12 For example, see Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988), Weisbach (1988), 
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ownership are less likely to be dismissed, consistent with Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997). 
 The results are not sensitive to the inclusion of ownership characteristics. Column 
(2) includes additional ownership-based variables: the average level of block institutional 
ownership, other institutional ownership in year t, as well as the change in these 
variables from year t-1 to year t. The coefficient estimate on the powerful blockholder 
linkage measure remains positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, and the 
conditional marginal effect remains economically large at 21%.  
It is important to note that the level of blockholder ownership is not associated 
with forced CEO turnover, consistent with the evidence in Kaplan and Minton (2012). 
The parameter estimate is statistically insignificant (t= 0.82), suggesting that large 
heterogeneity among blockholders makes drawing clear inferences difficult. On the 
contrary, both the level and the change in other non-block institutional ownership is 
related to lower forced CEO turnover, suggesting that relatively smaller investors lack 
incentives to actively influence CEO turnover decisions and tend to “vote with their feet” 
(Parrino, Sias, and Starks, 2003). More importantly, the inclusion of these variables does 
not significantly change the predictive power of the powerful blockholder linkage 
measure.  
 The results in Column (3) shows that the coefficient estimate on the powerful 
blockholder linkage measure remains positive and statistically significant at the 1% level 
with the inclusion of firm characteristics. The conditional marginal effect remains 
economically large at 20%. We include firm size, book leverage ratio, market-to-book 
ratio, profitability, as well as industry fixed effects at the two-digit SIC level. The results 
also show that forced CEO turnover is negatively associated with the market-to-book 
ratio and profitability, which indicates that poor recent performance increases the 
probability of dismissal, consistent with the findings in Jenter and Kanaan (2015). 
 The evidence also suggests that firm risk is not behind our findings. Column (4) 
shows that the coefficient estimate on powerful blockholder linkage remains positive and 
statistically significant after controlling for past annual stock return, return volatility, 
                                                                                                                                             
Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997), and Goyal and Park (2002). 
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and stock illiquidity following Goyal and Park (2002). The economic effect of powerful 
blockholder linkage remains large, as a one standard deviation change increases the 
probability of forced CEO turnover by 22% relative to the sample average probability. 
 In sum, these results indicate that the powerful blockholder linkage measure 
strongly predicts future forced CEO turnover beyond previously identified CEO 
characteristics and firm-level factors. In later analyses, we provide robustness tests to 
ensure that our results are not driven by industry, regional, supply chain, or inter-
locking board connections.  
3.2 Predicting Voluntary CEO Turnover  
The ability of the powerful blockholder linkage measure to predict future forced CEO 
turnover is consistent with the view that powerful blockholders are able to exert 
influence in the boardroom. It may also reflect the propensity for powerful blockholders 
to selectively own shares in a firm where the CEO is likely to change. Perhaps future 
CEO turnover – of both the forced and voluntary nature – is correlated with an 
unobservable firm characteristic, such as managerial restructuring, that powerful 
blockholders use to select companies to invest. This alternative non-monitoring 
explanation would be consistent with the evidence in the previous section. 
This restructuring explanation predicts that powerful blockholders select firms with 
both impending forced and voluntary CEO dismissal. However, our shareholder influence 
explanation predicts that the powerful blockholder linkage measure affects forced CEO 
turnover but not voluntary CEO turnover. This is because forced turnover requires a 
considerable amount of boardroom influence and power, whereas in voluntary CEO 
turnover, CEOs typically leave for personal reasons. We design a simple test of these 
two interpretations by estimating the following probit model in equation (2): 
, 1 , , , 1i t i t i t i tVoluntaryCEOTurnover α β Powerful blockholder linkage δ X ε        (2)
where Voluntary CEO Turnover is equal to 1 if the firm experiences a voluntary CEO 
turnover in year t+1. Powerful blockholder linkagei,t is defined the fraction of holdings by 
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powerful blockholders among the firm’s blockholders, and Xi,t is a vector representing 
firm control variables estimated in year t. As before, all specifications include year fixed 
effects to capture time-varying macroeconomic trends and cluster standard errors at the 
firm level. 
 Table V reports the regression results. Across all four columns, the powerful 
blockholder linkage measure is an insignificant predictor of the probability of voluntary 
CEO turnover. 13  These results suggest that powerful blockholders are unlikely to 
selectively own companies with impending CEO turnover. If that were the case, the 
powerful blockholder linkage measure would also predict voluntary CEO turnover. As we 
find no evidence of this prediction, we conclude that this particular type of omitted 
variable concern is unlikely to explain earlier findings. We also note that the stark 
difference between the results of forced CEO turnover and voluntary CEO turnover 
lends additional support to the accuracy of the CEO turnover classifications in Jenter 
and Kanaan (2015) and Peters and Wagner (2014). Throughout the paper, we provide 
tests to rule-out additional omitted variable concerns. 
3.3 Sources of Influence:  Blockholder Experience 
Given the ability of powerful blockholders to unseat standing CEOs, we ask a natural 
question: what could be the potential source of their ability? In this section, we 
hypothesize that powerful blockholders may learn from the valuable experience of 
dismissing CEOs in the past. Dismissing CEOs requires careful shareholder and 
boardroom coordination and also requires finding viable external candidates. 
Additionally, some CEOs have considerable power over corporate decisions (Adams, 
Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005) and may be difficult to dismiss. We predict that the 
experience of unseating a “difficult-to-dismiss” CEO is one potential source of their 
ability to fire CEOs in the future. We test this prediction by first defining powerful 
                                            
13 The estimates on the control variables show that older, founder, chairman CEOs are more likely to 
voluntarily quit, consistent with our previous findings. Also, CEOs with more share ownership are less 
likely to voluntarily resign their position. Institutional ownership is not associated with voluntary turnover 
as none of the institutional shareholder measures are significant. CEOs of larger firms with higher market 
valuations are more likely to voluntarily quit their positions. The results also show that voluntary CEO 
turnover is negatively associated with stock returns. 
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CEOs as CEO with long tenure14 and CEOs who are also the chairman of the board, 
following Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005). Then we reconstruct our powerful 
blockholder linkage measure using the same procedure but separately identify powerful 
blockholders from forced CEO turnover stocks with long tenure CEO versus short tenure 
CEOs, as well as from forced CEO turnover stocks with chairman CEOs versus non-
chairman CEOs. Using these measures, we repeat the regression analysis in Table IV. 
 Table VI presents evidence which suggests that monitoring experience is an 
important source of powerful blockholder influence. Panel A shows that the coefficient 
estimate on the powerful blockholder linkage measure constructed from long-tenure 
CEO dismissals is positive and statistically significant at better than the 1% level across 
all four regression specifications. The Chi-square tests shows that the differences in 
coefficient estimate between the two powerful blockholder linkage measures are 
statistically different. 
The results in Panel B suggest that the experience of firing chairman CEOs 
strongly relates to the ability to fire CEOs in the future. The coefficient estimate on the 
powerful blockholder linkage measure constructed with chairman CEO dismissals is 
positive and statistically significant at better than the 1% level across all specifications. 
In contrast, the past experience of firing non-chairman CEOs is insignificantly related to 
the ability to dismiss future CEOs as the coefficient estimates are insignificant on the 
powerful blockholder linkage measure constructed with non-chairman CEO dismissals 
across all four specifications.  
Aside from CEO characteristics, market conditions may also affect the difficulty of 
removing a CEO. Not surprisingly, we find that for stocks with forced CEO turnover, 
around 80% of them have negative industry-adjusted returns in the previous year. 
However, Jenter and Kanaan (2015) find that CEOs who underperform relative to their 
industry peers are more likely to be fired during industry downturns, but less so during 
                                            
14 We define “Founder” CEO as a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO is the same CEO when 
the firm first appears in the ExecuComp database and 0 otherwise. Instead of using the “Founder” CEO 
dummy, we use the more accurate actual CEO tenure reported in ExecuComp to identify “difficult-to-
dismiss” CEOs. 
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good times. This implies that it may be particularly challenging to remove an 
underperforming CEO from power when the industry is doing well. We expect that if 
blockholders are able to remove CEOs during periods of good industry performance, this 
track record likely reflects the extent of their governing ability and influence. As before, 
we test this prediction by separately reconstructing our powerful blockholder linkage 
measure from stocks with forced CEO turnover during good industry returns and during 
bad industry returns relative to the overall market. 
Panel C of Table V presents evidence that supports this view. The experience of 
firing of CEOs during times of good industry performance strongly relates to the ability 
to fire CEOs in the future. The coefficient estimate on the powerful blockholder linkage 
measure constructed with CEO dismissals during good industry stock performance is 
positive and statistically significant at better than the 1% level across all specifications. 
The Chi-square tests shows that differences in coefficients between the two powerful 
blockholder linkage measures are statistically different. 
Taken together, the evidence suggests that the experience of removing “difficult-to-
dismiss” CEOs or firing CEO during good industry performance is a source of 
blockholder influence and governing ability. These results offer new insights into the 
battle inside the corporate boardroom. In the next section, we explore another potential 
source behind the influence of powerful blockholders – their monitoring incentives. 
3.4 Sources of Influence:  Incentives to Monitor 
Another potential reason certain blockholders are influential is that they have strong 
incentives to actively monitor the management of their portfolio companies. Existing 
studies identify a number of ex-ante incentives that motivate shareholder monitoring, 
which we explore in detail in this section. A particularly strong economic motivation is 
the amount of ownership in a firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). For this reason, we focus 
on institutional blockholders with more than 5% ownership stakes in the firm. A clear 
ancillary prediction of our influence story is that relatively small investors should not 
have a role in forced CEO turnover. Non-block institutional investors may invest in 
stocks for diversification purposes or because of private information with no intention to 
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monitor. In either case, the occurrences of forced CEO turnover in their portfolio 
companies is unlikely to reflect their governing style or ability to monitor in this 
particular firm. 
To test this prediction, we gather other large institutional investors, who are not 
blockholders. Specifically, we focus on all of the top 10 largest institutional investors of 
each firm but with ownership below 5% of the firm’s shares outstanding. We compare 
the linkage effects from these investors with the effects from powerful blockholders. 
These non-block large investors have less motivation to monitor (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986) but are sophisticated investors and not necessarily suffer a significant information 
disadvantage relative to the blockholders. Following the same methodology, we create a 
shareholder linkage measure based on forced CEO turnover in the portfolio companies of 
these top 10 non-block investors and re-estimate our main tests.  
Panel A of Table VII presents evidence consistent with our prediction. The 
coefficient estimate on non-block large shareholder linkage is not significant in any of 
the regression specifications. This evidence largely mitigate the concern that the 
powerful blockholder linkage effects are driven by certain private information advantage 
of large institutional investors rather than their governing styles and monitoring abilities. 
This test also serves as a check that the construction of our linkage variable does not 
inadvertently capture underlying economic links across different firms. In a later section, 
we address this concern in detail. 
Our second test for monitoring incentives separates blockholders based on their 
investment horizons. Transient investors have short investment horizons while non-
transient investors on average hold stocks for longer periods (Bushee, 2001). Investors 
with longer holding horizons have greater incentives to monitor their portfolio firms 
because they are not likely to exit when they disagree with management (Chen, Harford, 
and Li, 2007). Transient investors on the other hand are less likely to monitor and may 
choose to sell their shares.  
The evidence suggests that the ability to force CEO turnover exists only among 
non-transient investors. Panel B of Table VII shows that the coefficient estimate on the 
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powerful blockholder linkage measure constructed within non-transient investors is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The chi-squared test of difference 
between the two coefficient estimates is also statistically significant. This finding 
suggests that the influence of powerful blockholders is predominantly held by those with 
longer horizons. 
Our third test distinguishes independent investors from grey investors. Independent 
investors are less likely to have potential business conflicts with their portfolio 
companies (e.g., Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1988; Almazan, Hartzell, and Stark, 2005), 
which increases their willingness to disrupt management. We therefore expect that the 
linkage effects of powerful blockholders are more pronounced among independent 
investors. Panel C of Table VII shows that the linkage effects on forced CEO turnover 
from powerful blockholders is concentrated within the group of independent 
blockholders. This is consistent with the findings in our prior two tests. Together, these 
results are consistent with the view that the ex-ante incentives to monitor is related to 
powerful blockholder influence. 
3.5 Robustness Tests 
We design a number of tests to ensure that our results are robust. One concern is that 
the powerful blockholder linkage measure embeds other underlying economic links that 
are potentially behind our findings. Examples include inter-locked boards, industry 
overlap, regional effects, supply-chain relationships, or previous history of forced CEO 
turnovers. As it is difficult to adequately control for these economics links in a 
regression, we re-construct our powerful blockholder linkage measure by excluding in turn 
each one of these potential economic channels. Then, we re-estimate the regression tests 
from Table IV using these re-constructed measures. 
Table VIII shows that our main inferences are unchanged after excluding economic 
links relating to: interlocked boards, industry overlaps, regional commonality, supplier-
and customer relationships. In particular, the power of the powerful blockholder linkage 
measure to predict forced CEO dismissal is similar after accounting for these alternative 
linkage channels. This evidence strongly suggests that the effects of powerful blockholder 
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are not driven by other omitted underlying economic connections among the 
blockholders’ portfolio companies. 
Next, we examine measurement issues in the construction of the powerful 
blockholder linkage measure. We motivate our measure based on the idea that past 
governance outcomes reflect the underlying monitoring ability and style of blockholders, 
which continues into the future behavior. However, this notion does not provide 
guidance on the design of the measure. In particular, we make two empirical choices in 
our variable construction. First, we define blockholders as institutional investors with 
greater than 5% ownership in the firm. Second, we set the cutoff at the bottom tercile of 
the sample in designating powerful/non-powerful blockholders.  
We address the sensitivity of our results to each of this choices. First, we change 
the definition of blockholder from more than 5% ownership to more than 1% ownership. 
We also use an alternative definition of “blockholder”, defined as one of the top 5 largest 
institutional investors of the firm. Second, we use alternative cutoffs at the median and 
1st quintile fraction of holdings in stocks with forced CEO turnover. The median cutoff 
imposes a stricter identification for powerful blockholders, while using the 1st quintile 
expands the quantity of powerful blockholders.  
The results in Table IX show that the main conclusions are unchanged using these 
alternative measures. Panel A reports results using the top five institutional investors to 
create the powerful blockholder linkage measure. Across the four specifications, the 
conditional marginal effects remain between 19% and 22%. This is similar to the main 
specification results in Table III. In Panel B, we define blockholders as institutional 
investor with greater than 1% ownership and find similar results. Panel C and panel D 
reports results using the median and 1st quintile cutoffs for identification of powerful 
blockholders. The coefficient estimate on the powerful blockholder linkage measure in 
both panels remain statistically significant at the 1% level. However the conditional 
marginal effects in these specifications are smaller than in our main specifications. This 
suggests that the use of tercile cutoffs provides an optimal classification of powerful 
blockholders. 
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Next, we examine if our findings are due to board and other corporate 
characteristics. Studies show that the probability of CEO turnover is greater for 
outsider-dominated boards (Weisbach, 1988; Kaplan and Minton, 1994), directors with 
outside directorships (Mobbs, 2013), and takeover provisions (Mikkelson and Partch, 
1997). One possible alternative interpretation is that our measure of powerful 
blockholders simply reflects the characteristics of the board of directors. To address this 
concern, we re-estimate our main probit specification and control for additional board 
characteristics. 
The evidence suggests that our main inferences are unchanged with the inclusion of 
board characteristics. The results in Panel A of Table X show that the coefficient 
estimate on powerful blockholder linkage remains positive and statistically significant, 
and the conditional marginal effects (19%) are similar to our main estimates. Columns 
(1) and (2) presents results using our main blockholder definition (>5% ownership). 
Column (3) shows the results are not sensitive to using top 5 institutional investors to 
construct the powerful blockholder linkage measure. The results are also similar using 
the >1% ownership definition for blockholder.  
A remaining concern with the powerful blockholder linkage measure is that it may 
capture other institutional blockholder characteristics. For example, because the 
measure is a fraction of powerful blockholders among all blockholders, it may correlate 
with the concentration of blockholders. Or it may inadvertently capture blockholder 
busyness which may distract from monitoring focus. To ensure that our measure is not 
affected by these characteristics, we control for blockholder concentration and busyness. 
Blockholder concentration is defined as the Herfindahl index of ownership among the 
firm’s institutional blockholders. Blockholder busyness is defined as the logarithm of the 
holdings-weighted number of block holdings across the each institutional blockholder in 
the firm. 
The results in Panel B of Table X show that our results are not sensitive to the 
inclusion of these additional blockholder characteristics. The coefficient estimate on 
powerful blockholder linkage remains positive and statistically significant, and the 
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conditional marginal effects (20%-23%) are slightly higher than the main estimates. The 
coefficient estimate on blockholder concentration is negative and statistically significant 
while blockholder busyness is insignificant. 
Overall, the evidence in this section provides a series of robustness tests showing 
that our results are not sensitive to: 1) measurement choices on the powerful 
shareholder linkage measure, 2) underlying economic firm links associated with 
shareholder linkages, 3) board characteristics, and 4) blockholder concentration and 
busyness. These results help to rule out potential alternative interpretations.  
4 Are Powerful Blockholders Good Monitors? 
Our tests to this point focus on one particular governance outcome – CEO turnover. 
However, it remains an open question whether the influence of powerful blockholders 
over management reflects good monitoring or simply “power”. If powerful shareholders 
are generally uninformed and tend to engage in reckless interventions (Fisman, Khurana, 
Rhodes-Kropf, and Yim, 2014), their influence may represent inefficient shareholder 
monitoring and destruction of firm value. On the other hand, if powerful shareholder 
monitoring is beneficial, then we should also expect other types of good governance 
outcomes.  
In this section, we answer this question by examining three additional governance 
outcomes. Our first test examines whether powerful blockholders affects CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity. In our second test, we follow Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) and 
examine whether the presence of powerful blockholders improves acquisition 
announcement returns. Finally, we test whether powerful blockholder linkages are 
associated with higher market valuations. 
4.1 CEO Turnover-Stock Performance Sensitivity 
Previous studies show that CEO turnover sensitivity to recent firm performance is 
associated with measures of corporate governance (e.g., Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Fich 
and Shivdasani, 2006; Kaplan and Minton, 2012). In some instances however, the results 
remain inconclusive. Kang and Shivdasani (1995) find that block ownership is not 
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related to CEO turnover-performance sensitivity in their sample of Japanese firms. 
Kaplan and Minton (2012) also find that CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is not 
related to the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index or SOX legislation. 
We examine whether the sensitivity of CEO turnover to stock performance relates to the 
powerful blockholder linkage measure in our sample. 
 We separate the sample into two groups based on whether the powerful blockholder 
linkage measure is above or below the median. We perform analysis within each group 
in case there are systematic differences in characteristics between firms with high and 
low powerful blockholder linkage. We standardize the stock return in the previous year 
to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.15  Then, within each group, we 
estimate a probit model of forced CEO turnover on the firm’s stock return in the 
previous year using the following equation (3): 
, 1 , , , 1i t i t i t i tForcedCEOTurnover α β Standardized Stock Return δ X ε       . (3)
The dependent variable is the forced CEO turnover dummy. Xi,t is a vector 
representing firm control variables estimated in year t. All specifications include year 
fixed effects to capture macro-economic effects and cluster standard errors at the firm 
level. We report the marginal effects of the probit regressions in Panel A of Table XI. 
The first two columns reports results from the high powerful blockholder linkage sample, 
while the next two columns report results from the low powerful blockholder linkage 
sample. 
The results indicate that CEO dismissal is more sensitive to past stock performance 
among stocks with higher powerful blockholder linkages. Column (1) shows that for 
stocks with high powerful blockholder linkage measure, the coefficient estimate on the 
standardized stock return is -0.015 (t=-4.75). The regression specification includes 
controls for CEO and ownership characteristics. The same coefficient estimate in column 
(3) for the low powerful blockholder linkage measure sample is -0.007 (t=-3.08). The 
                                            
15 This procedure is helpful for three reasons. First, it allows for comparability in the coefficient estimates 
across the two groups. Second, it acts as a market-adjustment for stock returns. Third, it creates a relative 
performance metric. 
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relative comparison suggests that stocks with high powerful blockholder linkage are 
twice as likely to dismiss CEOs for poor performance. Columns (2) and (4) show that 
the results are similar with the inclusion of firm characteristics and industry fixed 
effects. The coefficient estimate remains twice as large for the high powerful blockholder 
linkage sample compared to the low powerful blockholder linkage sample. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that CEOs are more likely to be dismissed after poor 
stock performance at firms with higher powerful blockholder linkages. This is consistent 
with the view that powerful blockholders are associated with better governance 
outcomes. In the next two sections, we explore whether powerful blockholders are 
related to direct valuation outcomes. 
4.2 Announcement Returns in Acquisitions 
For our second governance test, we examine mergers and acquisitions. These decisions 
have the potential to generate deviations in shareholder and manager interest (Chen, 
Harford, and Li, 2007). We hypothesis that powerful blockholders mitigate these 
divergent interests. To measure the quality of an M&A deal, we estimate the bidder 
announcement return as the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns using an estimation 
window from t=-300 to t-46. We ensure that the deals are material by requiring that the 
deal value exceeds 50 million dollars. We estimate a panel regression using the following 
equation (4):  
, 1 , , , 1i t i t i t i tBidderCAR α β Powerful blockholder linkage δ X ε       . (4)
 Bidder CAR is the three day cumulative abnormal return around acquisition 
announcement at t+1. The dependent variable is the powerful blockholder linkage 
measure used throughout the paper. Xi,t is a vector representing firm control variables, 
estimated in year t. For the acquisitions regressions, we include additional merger 
characteristics such as deal value, tender offer dummy, cash offer dummy, and same 
industry dummy following the convention in the literature. All specifications include 
year fixed effects to capture macro-economic trends and industry fixed effects to capture 
heterogeneity in industry merger activity. We cluster standard errors at the year-level 
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because acquisitions tend to happen in waves.  
The results show that the powerful shareholder linkage measure significantly 
predicts higher bidder announcement returns. Panel B of Table XI shows that the 
coefficient estimate on powerful blockholder linkage remains positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Column (1) shows that a one standard deviation increase in 
powerful shareholder linkage increases the bidder announcement returns by 0.45%, which 
is considerably large relative to the sample average of -0.36%. This specification includes 
controls for deal characteristics, ownership attributes, and firm characteristics. Cash 
offers are associated with favorable market reactions while larger deal values tend to 
receive lower market reactions. Column (2) shows that results are robust to the inclusion 
of additional firm risk and liquidity characteristics including stock return, return 
volatility, and illiquidity. As a robustness tests, we re-estimate the regressions without 
stocks that experienced forced CEO turnovers in the next year. This ensures that our 
results are not due to the same underlying process for forced CEO turnover. The results 
presented in Columns (3) and (4) show that the patterns are similar among this sample 
of firms. 
In sum, the pattern of higher bidder announcement returns is consistent with the 
view that powerful blockholders provide good monitoring and governance of their 
portfolio firms. In the next section, we consider firm value as another governance 
outcome. 
4.3 Firm Valuation 
To the extent that the monitoring actions of powerful blockholders represent good 
governance, we expect firms with a greater fraction of powerful blockholders to have 
higher market valuations. Previous studies show that governance mechanisms are 
associated with higher Tobin’s Q (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). We 
test this hypothesis by estimate panel regressions using the following equation (5): 
, 1 , , , 1' i t i t i t i tTobin sQ α β Powerful blockholder linkage δ X ε       . (5)
The dependent variable is Tobins’ Q measured as the market-to-book ratio at the 
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end of year t+1. Xi,t is a vector representing firm control variables estimated in year t. 
We include measures of ownership since they relate to firm value (McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990).  
Table XI, Panel C reports the results. Column (1) shows that the powerful 
blockholder linkage measure is a positive and significant predictor of firm value. The 
coefficient estimate remains significant with the inclusion of firm characteristics in 
Columns (2). Columns (3) and (4) show that the coefficient on powerful blockholder 
linkage measure remains positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for stocks 
without forced CEO turnovers. A one standard deviation increase in powerful 
shareholder linkage increases Tobin’s Q by 1.6% relative to the unconditional sample 
average. 
4.4 Falsification Test 
One remaining concern is that the powerful blockholder linkage measure spuriously 
captures an unobserved firm variable that is correlated with governance outcomes. We 
have constructed tests to address and rule out numerous alternative explanations in the 
previous sections. For example, we have addressed concerns relating to underlying 
economic firm links associated with shareholder linkages, board characteristics, and 
blockholder concentration and busyness. Yet, we recognize the lingering possibility of an 
omitted variable that is behind our findings. 
 For our final attempt to address this issue, we provides a set of falsifications tests 
using a measure of blockholder linkage with other firms that have voluntary CEO 
turnover. We re-estimate all of our key findings in this study using this variable. We 
argue that any possible, unaddressed omitted variable that correlates with blockholder 
linkages based on forced CEO turnover is likely to also relate to linkages based on 
voluntary CEO turnover. However, as previously explained, our power and influence 
channel only works through forced CEO turnover, and not voluntary CEO turnover. 
Therefore, we create a “placebo” test to examine whether our results are indeed working 
through the power and influence hypothesis we put forth in the paper. We follow the 
same procedure to link firms using voluntary CEO turnovers. We first identify powerful 
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blockholder using voluntary CEO turnover, then construct an alternative blockholder 
linkage measure using this definition of powerful blockholders.  
Table XII presents the results. From Panel A to Panel E, we examine the forced 
CEO turnover, voluntary CEO turnover, bidder announcement return, CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity, and firm value, respectively. We repeat the previous analyses 
with the same specifications and for brevity we only report the variables of interest. 
Overall, the results show that there is little blockholder linkage effects from voluntary 
CEO turnovers. These results lend further support to our argument that the governing 
styles/abilities of powerful blockholders can be inferred from the track records of 
prominent governance outcomes such as forced CEO turnovers in their portfolio 
companies. 
5 Conclusion 
It is widely recognized that institutional blockholders are monitors of corporate 
managers. However, monitoring activities often occurs during private, “behind-the-
scenes” meetings. This makes it difficult for researchers to draw clear inferences 
regarding the effectiveness of blockholder monitoring.  
 We propose an approach to detect the ability of institutional blockholders to 
influence management using the occurrences of forced CEO turnover at other firms in 
the blockholders’ overall portfolio. One benefit of this track-record approach is that it is 
unlikely to be endogenously related to the firm itself. We identify a group of powerful 
blockholders and find a consistent pattern of evidence to suggest that these investors 
have considerable power and influence in the boardroom. Our findings suggest that 
powerful blockholders are less likely to vote with management recommendations in 
director elections than other blockholders. We create a “powerful blockholder linkage” 
measure that strongly predicts future forced CEO turnovers. There is no effect on 
voluntary CEO turnovers.  
 These “powerful” blockholders tend to be among long-term and independent 
investors, and are more likely to be those who have experienced the firing of long-
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tenured CEOs and chairman CEOs, or the firing of under-performing CEOs even when 
the overall industry performance is good. Moreover, firms with powerful blockholders 
display higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivities, pursue more value-increasing 
acquisitions, and have higher firm value. Overall, our evidence suggests that an 
identifiable group of powerful blockholders play an important role in corporate 
governance.  
Our study focuses on a primary internal governance mechanism – large shareholder 
monitoring. It would be interesting for future research to examine whether the strength 
of this internal mechanism interacts with external governance. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
Forced CEO Turnover Dummy: A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has a forced 
CEO turnover in the year and 0 otherwise. We obtain the data on forced and voluntary CEO 
turnovers for all firms in the S&P ExecuComp database during the period of 1993 to 2010 from 
Jenter and Kanaan (2015).  
Voluntary CEO Turnover Dummy: A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has a 
voluntary CEO turnover in the year and 0 otherwise. We obtain the data on forced and 
voluntary CEO turnovers for all firms in the S&P ExecuComp database during the period of 
1993 to 2010 from Jenter and Kanaan (2015).  
Powerful Blockholder Linkage (Ownership>5%): We focus on the institutional blockholders of 
each firm. An institutional investor is considered to be a blockholder if its ownership is above 5 
percent of the firm’s share outstanding. We construct this measure in two steps. First, we 
identify a group of “powerful” block institutional investors. For each year t, we split the universe 
of firms in the ExecuComp database into two subsamples by whether firms have forced CEO 
turnovers during the year. We select the complete set of these institutional investors from all of 
the firms that have forced CEO turnovers. Then, among this set of investors, we define an 
investor as a powerful blockholder if the fraction of holdings of stocks with forced CEO 
turnovers in its portfolio is above the bottom tercile fraction. Second, for each firm i without any 
forced CEO turnovers during year t, we calculate the fraction of blockholdings that are held by 
the powerful blockholers among the institutional blockholders of firm i, as the degree of powerful 
blockholder linkage. Specifically, for firm i at quarter s, the powerful blockholder linkage is 
defined as: 
, ,
 Powerful Blockholders among Institional Blockholders
,
, ,
 Institutional Blockholders
Powerful Blockholder Linkage =
i j s
j
i s
i j s
j
H
H




, 
where , ,i j sH is the institutional holdings of stock i by investor j. We use the yearly average 
powerful blockholder linkage (across four quarters) as our main measure in later analyses. The 
data on quarterly institutional holdings are from Thomason CDA/Spectrum 13F database.   
Powerful Blockholder Linkage (Ownership>1%): We follow the same procedure as above to 
calculate the measure of forced blockholder linkage, but we define an institutional investor to be 
a blockholder if its ownership is above 1 percent of the firm’s share outstanding.  
Powerful Blockholder Linkage (Top 5 Institutional Investor): We follow the same procedure as 
above to calculate the measure of forced blockholder linkage, but we focus on the top 5 
institutional investors ranked by the amount of holdings of the company’s common stock. 
Block Inst. Ownership (Ownership>5%): the number of shares held by the block institutional 
investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding. We define an institutional investor 
to be a blockholder if its ownership is above 5 percent of the firm’s share outstanding. 
Block Inst. Ownership (Ownership>1%): the number of shares held by the block institutional 
investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding. We define an institutional investor 
to be a blockholder if its ownership is above 1 percent of the firm’s share outstanding. 
Block Inst. Ownership (Top 5 Inst. Investor): the number of shares held by the top 5 
institutional investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding. 
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Total Institutional Ownership: the number of shares held by all of the institutional investors 
divided by the number of shares outstanding. 
Other Inst. Ownership (5%, 1%, Top 5): the difference between total institutional ownership 
and block institutional ownership (>5%, >1%, Top5), defined respectively.  
CEO Tenure: the logarithm of the number of years since the CEO resumes office.  
CEO Age: the logarithm of the CEO’s age. 
Chairman: a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board 
and 0 otherwise. We obtain the information from the annual job titles of the CEO. 
Founder: a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO is the same CEO when the firm first 
appears in the ExecuComp database and 0 otherwise.  
CEO Ownership: the number of stocks held by the CEO divided by the number of shares 
outstanding. 
Firm Size: the log value of book assets (AT). 
Market-to-Book: market value of assets/book assets (AT), where the market value of assets is 
calculated as: stock price (PRCC_F) * shares outstanding (CSHO) + short term debt(DLC) + 
long term debt(DLTT) + preferred stock liquidation value (PSTKL) – deferred taxes and 
investment tax credits (TXDITC). 
Book Leverage: total debt/book assets (AT), where the total debt is long term debt (DLTT) + 
short term debt (DLC). 
Profitability: operating income before depreciation (OIBDP)/book assets (AT). 
Stock Return: the cumulative stock return in a year.  
Return Volatility: the standard deviation of monthly stock returns in a year. 
Amihud Illiquidity: the Amihud (2000) illiquidity measure, at annual frequency. It averages the 
square root of the ratio of the absolute price change divided by daily dollar volume over each 
day in year t. It is calculated as: ܫ݈݈݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ௜,௧ ൌ ଵ஽೟ ∑ ሺ1000 ∗ ට
|ௗ௔௜௟௬	௥௘௧௨௥௡|
ௗ௔௜௟௬	ௗ௢௟௟௔௥	௩௢௟௨௠௘ሻௗ௔௬௦∈௧ , 
Staggered Board Dummy: a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a classified board and 0 
otherwise. We obtain the data on board characteristics from RiskMetrics.  
Board Size: the logarithm of the number of directors on the board. 
Board Age: the logarithm of the average age of the directors on the board. 
Busy Board Dummy: a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if at least one of directors of the firm 
is also on the boards of other companies.  
Affiliated Board Members: the percentage of affiliated board members, as the ratio of the 
number of affiliated outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board.  
Insider Board Members: the percentage of insider board members, as the ratio of the number of 
inside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board.  
Supermajority Dummy: a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has supermajority provisions in 
the shareholder voting and 0 otherwise. 
Poison Pill Dummy: a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has poison pills as the anti-
takeover devices and 0 otherwise.   
Golden Parachute Dummy: a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO has severance agreement 
with the firm contingent on a change in corporate control and 0 otherwise.  
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Table I 
Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents summary statistics of the main variables used in the study. The data on quarterly 
stock holdings of institutional investors are from Thomson CDA/Spectrum (13F). The data on daily and 
monthly stock returns, trading volumes and annual accounting information are from Compustat and 
CRSP. We obtain the data on forced and voluntary CEO turnovers for all firms in the S&P ExecuComp 
database during the period of 1993 to 2010 from Jenter and Kanaan (2015). The data on CEO 
characteristics are obtained from ExecuComp. The data on board characteristics are obtained from ISS 
RiskMetrics. In our later multivariate analyses, all of the sample firms do not have forced CEO turnovers 
during the year in which we calculate the powerful blockholder linkage (by construction). The complete 
sample includes 18540 firm-year observations. For each variable, we report the mean, the median, the 
standard deviation and the number of observations. The detailed definitions can be found in the 
appendix.  
 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. N
  
Forced CEO Turnover Dummy 0.024 0.000 0.154 18540
Voluntary CEO Turnover Dummy 0.035 0.000 0.185 18540
  
Powerful Blockholder Linkage (Ownership>5%) 0.221 0.133 0.258 16385
Powerful Blockholder Linkage (Ownership>1%) 0.376 0.375 0.177 17950
Powerful Blockholder Linkage (Top 5 Inst. Investor) 0.264 0.238 0.187 17950
  
Block Inst. Ownership (Ownership>5%) 0.200 0.176 0.121 16385
Block Inst. Ownership (Ownership>1%) 0.470 0.470 0.189 17950
Block Inst. Ownership (Top 5 Inst. Investor) 0.267 0.262 0.100 17950
Total Inst. Ownership 0.663 0.684 0.213 18540
CEO Tenure 1.693 1.792 0.931 18540
CEO Age 4.023 4.025 0.134 18540
Chairman 0.584 1.000 0.493 18540
Founder 0.543 1.000 0.498 18540
CEO Ownership 0.026 0.001 0.066 18540
Firm Size 7.276 7.107 1.659 18540
Book Leverage 0.217 0.204 0.180 18540
Market-to-Book 1.800 1.251 2.200 18540
Profitability 0.136 0.134 0.121 18540
Stock Return 0.210 0.103 0.681 18540
Return Volatility 0.028 0.024 0.016 18540
Amihud Illiquidity 0.080 0.045 0.103 18540
Staggered Board Dummy 0.419 0.000 0.493 11464
Board Size 2.187 2.197 0.263 11464
Board Age 4.092 4.103 0.081 11464
Busy Board Dummy 0.506 1.000 0.500 11464
Affiliated Board Members  0.113 0.100 0.129 11464
Insider Board Members  0.192 0.167 0.107 11464
Supermajority Dummy 0.120 0.000 0.325 10925
Poison Pill Dummy 0.524 1.000 0.499 10925
Golden Parachute Dummy 0.631 1.000 0.482 10925
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Table II 
Identification of Powerful Blockholders 
 
In this table, we identify powerful blockholders by the holding fraction of stocks with forced CEO 
turnover in their portfolios, from which we construct the measure of powerful blockholder linkage. For 
each firm, we focus on the institutional blockholders with ownership more than 5% of the company’s 
shares outstanding.  
       In Panel A, for each block institutional investor, we calculate the size of portfolio holdings, and the 
fraction of portfolio holdings in stocks with forced CEO turnovers in the year. We separately report the 
statistics for the blockholders with at least one forced CEO turnover stocks. Among these investors, we 
identify an investor as powerful blockholder if the fraction of holdings of forced CEO turnover stocks in its 
portfolio is above the bottom tecile fraction in the sample. We report the mean, median and the number 
of investor-quarter observations. 
        In Panel B, we report the Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the measure of powerful 
blockholder linkage and other major firm characteristics as well as the p-values. For each firm, powerful 
blockholder linkage is the fraction of intuitional holdings that are held by the powerful blockholders 
among all of the block institutional investors. By construction, all of the firms here do not have forced 
CEO turnovers in the year in which we construct the powerful blockholder linkage. 
Panel A: Blockholder Holdings of Forced CEO Turnover Stocks 
 Size of Portfolio 
Holdings 
($millions) 
Fraction of Holdings  
in Forced CEO 
Turnover Stocks 
Number 
of Obs. 
(Quarter)  Mean Median Mean Median 
Block Institutional Investors 3312.18 302.41 3.0% 0.0% 25305
  
Block Institutional Investors 
(Holding at least 1 stock with forced CEO turnover) 
15699.07 1994.95 22.3% 7.2% 3450
  
Powerful Blockholders 
(Holding at least 1 stock with forced CEO turnover) 
8856.27 854.52 32.0% 15.8% 2346
  
Other Blockholders 
(Holding at least 1 stock with forced CEO turnover) 
30240.04 9980.34 1.6% 1.4% 1104
Panel B: Correlation between Powerful Blockholder Linkage and Other Variables 
Pearson's Correlation Powerful Blockholder Linkage p-value
Block Institutional Ownership 0.00 0.84 
Other Institutional Ownership 0.05 0.00 
Firm Size 0.06 0.00 
Book Leverage 0.01 0.37 
Market-to-Book -0.02 0.00 
Profitability -0.05 0.00 
Yearly Return -0.04 0.00 
Return Volatility 0.01 0.08 
Amihud Illiquidity -0.01 0.13 
CEO Tenure 0.00 0.53 
CEO Age -0.01 0.17 
Chairman 0.00 0.32 
Founder -0.08 0.00 
CEO Ownership -0.01 0.00 
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Table III 
Director Voting of Powerful Institutional Blockholders 
 
In this table, we provide an analysis of the voting records of director elections by powerful blockholders 
and other blockholders. We obtain a sample of mutual fund voting data from Voting Analytics from 2003 
to 2008, and we aggregate the voting data at the institutional investor level. First, for each institution-
stock-quarter, we calculate the average fraction of “For” votes among total votes by the investor across 
different director proposals of the stock. We also calculate an excess fraction as the difference between the 
investor’s fraction of “For” votes and the overall fraction of “For” votes among all voting investors. Then, 
for each investor-quarter, we calculate the average (excess) fraction of “For” votes across different stocks 
in its portfolio. We perform both t-tests and Wilcoxon tests to compare the results between powerful 
blockholders and other blockholders.  
      Panel A reports the results based on the overall sample of stocks in the Voting Analytics data. We 
separately report the results for director election proposals with “For” recommendations from Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS), and the ones with “Against” or “Withhold” ISS recommendations. Panel B 
provides both an “in-sample” analysis on director elections of stocks covered in the ExecuComp database, 
and an “out-of-sample” analysis on director elections of stocks not covered in ExecuComp (i.e, we do not 
rely on these stocks to identify powerful blockholders). 
 
Panel A: Full Sample Tests 
Director Elections: All Proposals Powerful 
Blockholders 
Other 
Blockholders 
T-test Wilcoxon
Fraction of “For” Votes 0.876 0.917 -4.19*** -5.42***
 (322) (939)  
Excess Fraction of “For” Votes -0.075 -0.033 -4.27*** -5.91*** 
 (322) (939)  
Director Elections: ISS Recommendation “For”  
Fraction of “For” Votes 0.909 0.948 -3.98*** -5.57***
 (322) (939)  
Excess Fraction of “For” Votes -0.057 -0.016 -4.09*** -5.39*** 
 (322) (939)  
Director Elections: ISS Recommendation “Against” or “Withhold”  
Fraction of “For” Votes 0.489 0.516 -0.99 -1.05
 (285) (810)  
Excess Fraction of “For” Votes -0.284 -0.244 -1.46 -1.89* 
 (285) (810)  
 
Panel B: In-sample and Out-of-Sample Tests 
Director Elections: Proposals of  
ExecuComp Stocks 
Powerful 
Blockholders 
Other 
Blockholders 
T-test Wilcoxon
Fraction of “For” Votes 0.881 0.922 -4.11*** -5.08***
 (318) (939)  
Excess Fraction of “For” Votes -0.070 -0.029 -4.14*** -5.61*** 
 (318) (939)  
Director Elections: Proposals of  
Non-ExecuComp Stocks 
 
Fraction of “For” Votes 0.821 0.901 -5.55*** -5.85***
 (241) (641)  
Excess Fraction of “For” Votes -0.130 -0.050 -5.72*** -6.07*** 
 (241) (641)  
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Table IV 
Predicting Forced CEO Turnover by Powerful Blockholder Linkage 
In this table, we examine the relation between powerful blockholder linkage and the probability of future 
forced CEO turnovers. Specifically, we estimate the following probit model: 
         , 1 , , , 1Forced CEO Turnover Dummy Powerful Blockhoder Linkagei t i t i t i tX , 
where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has a forced CEO turnover 
in year t+1 and 0 otherwise. We always cluster the errors at the firm level. All the independent variables 
are taken in year t. For each column, we report the conditional marginal effect of powerful blockholder 
linkage, as the ratio of the increase in CEO turnover probability due to one standard deviation increase in 
powerful blockholder linkage divided by the predicted probability. ***, ** and * represent significance 
levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, using robust standard errors with t-statistics given in parentheses. 
Dep. Var.: Forced Turnover Dummy (1) (2) (3) (4)
  
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.338*** 0.339*** 0.313*** 0.290***
 (4.18) (4.13) (3.73) (3.44)
Controls  
CEO Tenure -0.022 -0.025 -0.021 -0.023
 (-0.69) (-0.80) (-0.65) (-0.68)
CEO Age -0.638*** -0.610*** -0.509*** -0.393**
 (-3.84) (-3.67) (-2.86) (-2.21)
Chairman -0.111** -0.097** -0.100** -0.099**
 (-2.45) (-2.12) (-2.08) (-2.04)
Founder -0.206*** -0.199*** -0.207*** -0.235***
 (-3.63) (-3.48) (-3.39) (-3.74)
CEO Ownership -1.614** -1.891*** -2.009*** -2.089***
 (-2.56) (-2.88) (-2.85) (-2.81)
Block Inst. Ownership 0.152 0.023 0.085
 (0.82) (0.12) (0.43)
Other Inst. Ownership -0.462*** -0.337** -0.185
 (-2.97) (-1.97) (-0.96)
Change in Block Inst. Ownership -0.405 -0.278 0.052
 (-1.30) (-0.93) (0.18)
Change in Other Inst. Ownership -1.000*** -0.798*** 0.009
 (-3.31) (-2.76) (0.03)
Firm Size 0.002 0.031
 (0.10) (1.51)
Book Leverage 0.192 0.113
 (1.42) (0.82)
Market-to-Book -0.039** -0.016
 (-2.19) (-1.08)
Profitability -0.693*** -0.223
 (-3.70) (-1.10)
Stock Return -0.302***
 (-5.45)
Return Volatility 12.190***
 (6.11)
Amihud Illiquidity 0.025
 (0.08)
  
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE (2-digit SIC) - - Y Y 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm
Number of Observations 16,385 16,385 16,385 16,385
Conditional Marginal Effects 21%*** 21%*** 20%*** 19%***
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Table V 
Predicting Voluntary CEO Turnover by Powerful Blockholder Linkage 
In this table, we examine the relation between voluntary blockholder linkage and the probability of future 
voluntary CEO turnovers. Specifically, we estimate the following probit model: 
         , 1 , , , 1Voluntary CEO Turnover Dummy Powerful Blockhoder Linkagei t i t i t i tX , 
where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has a voluntary CEO 
turnover in year t+1 and 0 otherwise. We always cluster the errors at the firm level. All the independent 
variables are taken in year t. For each column, we report the conditional marginal effect of powerful 
blockholder linkage on voluntary CEO turnover, as the ratio of the increase in voluntary CEO turnover 
probability due to one standard deviation increase in powerful blockholder linkage divided by the 
predicted probability at the mean. ***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively, using robust standard errors with t-statistics given in parentheses. 
Dep. Var.: Voluntary Turnover Dummy (1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.027 0.022 0.024 0.028
 (0.29) (0.24) (0.25) (0.30)
Controls 
CEO Tenure -0.009 -0.011 -0.014 -0.014
 (-0.34) (-0.42) (-0.49) (-0.47)
CEO Age 2.232*** 2.227*** 2.352*** 2.379***
 (9.93) (9.92) (10.21) (10.28)
Chairman 0.166*** 0.164*** 0.152*** 0.150***
 (3.20) (3.11) (2.82) (2.78)
Founder 0.133** 0.139** 0.164*** 0.160**
 (2.28) (2.37) (2.65) (2.55)
CEO Ownership -1.347*** -1.364*** -1.322*** -1.296***
 (-3.38) (-3.30) (-3.03) (-2.98)
Block Inst. Ownership -0.271 -0.219 -0.190
 (-1.27) (-1.02) (-0.89)
Other Inst. Ownership 0.006 -0.175 -0.259
 (0.04) (-1.00) (-1.34)
Change in Block Inst. Ownership -0.034 -0.019 0.082
 (-0.11) (-0.06) (0.27)
Change in Other Inst. Ownership -0.344 -0.372 -0.103
 (-1.31) (-1.36) (-0.34)
Firm Size 0.045** 0.038*
 (2.51) (1.70)
Book Leverage -0.191 -0.181
 (-1.33) (-1.25)
Market-to-Book 0.018** 0.020**
 (2.32) (2.48)
Profitability 0.040 0.108
 (0.18) (0.46)
Stock Return -0.104**
 (-2.10)
Return Volatility 1.975
 (0.86)
Amihud Illiquidity -0.449
 (-1.14)
 
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Industry FE (2-digit SIC) - - Y Y
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm
Number of Observations 16,385 16,385 16,385 16,385
Conditional Marginal Effects 2% 2% 2% 2%
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Table VI 
Predicting Forced CEO Turnover: Blockholder Experience 
 
In this table, we deepen our analysis of the blockholder linkage effects on CEO turnovers, by 
distinguishing whether the fired CEO from the linked firm is the chairman of the board or by the CEO 
tenure. We follow the same specifications as in Table IV where the dependent variable is always the forced 
CEO turnover dummy in the next year. For brevity, we only report the coefficients of the interested 
variables. 
       In Panel A, we distinguish the linked firms with forced CEO turnovers by CEO tenure. In each year, 
we separate the fired CEOs into long-tenured CEOs and short-tentured CEOs by the sample median. We 
calculate two powerful blockholder linkage measures: one is only based on the forced turnover firms in 
which the fired CEO has short tenture, and the other one is only based on the forced turnover firms in 
which the fired CEO has long tenure. To compare the economic significances, we standardize the two 
linkage measures to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 (by subtracting the mean and 
dividing by the standard deviation, respectively). We test the statistical difference in coefficient of the two 
linkage measures and report the Chi-square statistics accordingly. 
       In Panel B, we distinguish the linked firms with forced CEO turnovers by whether the fired CEO is 
the chairman of the board or not. We calculate two powerful blockholder linkage measures: one is only 
based on the forced turnover firms in which the fired CEO is not the chairman of the board, and the other 
one is only based on the forced turnover firms in which the fired CEO is the chairman of the board. To 
compare the economic significances, we standardize the two linkage measures to have a mean of 0 and a 
standard deviation of 1 (by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation, respectively). 
We test the statistical difference in coefficient of the two linkage measures and report the Chi-square 
statistics accordingly. 
      In Panel C, we distinguish the linked firms with forced CEO turnovers by the overall industry 
performance. We calculate two powerful blockholder linkage measures: one is only based on the forced 
turnover firms for which the industry average return is above the market return, and the other is based on 
the forced turnover firms for which the industry average return is below the market return. To compare 
the economic significances, we standardize the two linkage measures to have a mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 1 (by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation, respectively). We test the 
statistical difference in coefficient of the two linkage measures and report the Chi-square statistics 
accordingly. ***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, using robust 
standard errors with t-statistics given in parentheses. 
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Table VI (Continued) 
 
  Panel A: Linkages with Forced Turnover Firms by CEO Tenure 
Dep. Var.: Forced Turnover Dummy (1) (2) (3) (4)
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.013 0.010 0.006 0.006
(with Forced CEO Turnover Firms: CEO 
with Short Tenure) 
(0.61) (0.45) (0.27) (0.28)
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.080*** 0.082*** 0.079*** 0.075***
(From Forced CEO Turnover Firms: CEO 
with Long Tenure) 
(3.83) (3.92) (3.73) (3.53)
  
Same Specification as in Table IV Y Y Y Y
Chi-square Test: Difference in Coefficients 4.08** 4.80** 4.80** 4.21**
Number of Observations 15,915 15,915 15,915 15,915
 
 
  Panel B: Linkages with Forced Turnover Firms by Whether CEO is Chairman 
Dep. Var.: Forced Turnover Dummy (1) (2) (3) (4)
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.027 0.024 0.014 0.008
(with Forced Turnover Firms: CEO not as Chairman) (1.25) (1.09) (0.62) (0.36)
  
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.070*** 0.072*** 0.068*** 0.066***
(with Forced Turnover Firms: CEO as Chairman) (3.36) (3.41) (3.19) (3.08)
  
Same Specification as in Table IV Y Y Y Y
Chi-square Test: Difference in Coefficients 1.86 2.26 2.72* 3.01*
Number of Observations 15,915 15,915 15,915 15,915
 
  Panel C: Linkages with Forced Turnover Firms by Overall Industry Performance 
Dep. Var.: Forced Turnover Dummy (1) (2) (3) (4)
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.086*** 0.088*** 0.084*** 0.081***
(with Forced CEO Turnover Firms: Industry 
Average Return above Market Return) 
(4.17) (4.22) (3.93) (3.75)
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.026 0.023 0.018 0.015
(with Forced CEO Turnover Firms: Industry 
Average Return below Market Return) 
(1.24) (1.07) (0.82) (0.70)
  
Same Specification as in Table IV Y Y Y Y
Chi-square Test: Difference in Coefficients 3.70** 4.32** 4.28** 4.10**
Number of Observations 15,915 15,915 15,915 15,915
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Table VII 
Predicting Forced CEO Turnover: Blockholder Motivation 
 
In this table, we further explore the shareholder linkage effects on CEO turnovers, by distinguishing 
blockholders by their investment styles and investor types. We also provide a “placebo” test based on the 
linkage from non-block large institutional investors that hold stocks with forced CEO turnovers. We follow 
the same specifications as in Table IV where the dependent variable is always the forced CEO turnover 
dummy in the next year. For brevity, we only report the coefficients of the interested variables. 
      In Panel A, we provide a “placebo” test and examine the relationship between the linkage from non-
block large institutional investors and the forced CEO turnover. We focus on all of the top 10 largest 
institutional investors of each firm but with an ownership below 5% of the firm’s shares outstanding. We 
follow the exact same steps as before to calculate the non-block large shareholder linkage.  
      In Panel B, we distinguish blockholders by their investment styles. We use data on institutional 
investor style classification (Transient/Quasi-indexer/Dedicated) obtained from Brian Bushee’s website. 
We follow the same steps as before to calculate the transient (non-transient) powerful blockholder linkage, 
as the fraction of holdings of transient (non-transient) powerful blockholders among the firm’s 
blockholders. To compare the economic significances, we standardize the measures of transient and non-
transient powerful block linkage to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 (by subtracting the 
mean and dividing by the standard deviation, respectively). We test the statistical difference in coefficient 
of the two linkage measures and report the Chi-square statistics accordingly.  
      In Panel D, we distinguish blockholders by their types. First, we divide institutions into two groups: 
independent institutions (investment companies, independent investment advisors, public pension funds) 
and grey institutions (bank trusts, insurance companies, corporate pension funds, and other institutions). 
Second, we separately calculate the powerful blockholder linkage measures based on the independent 
institutions and the grey institutions. We follow the same steps as before to calculate the grey 
(independent) powerful blockholder linkage, as the fraction of holdings of grey (independent) powerful 
blockholders among the firm’s blockholders. To compare the economic significances, we standardize the 
two linkage measures to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 (by subtracting the mean and 
dividing by the standard deviation, respectively). We test the statistical difference in coefficient of the two 
linkage measures and report the Chi-square statistics accordingly. ***, ** and * represent significance 
levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, using robust standard errors with t-statistics given in parentheses. 
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Table VII (Continued) 
 
  Panel A: Linkage from Non-Block Large Institutional Investors 
Dep. Var.: Forced Turnover Dummy (1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-block Large Shareholder Linkage 0.097 0.111 0.158 0.145
 (0.63) (0.72) (1.03) (0.94)
  
Same Specification as in Table IV Y Y Y Y
Number of Observations 16,385 16,385 16,385 16,385
 
 
  Panel B: Linkages from Transient and Non-Transient Blockholders 
Dep. Var.: Forced Turnover Dummy (1) (2) (3) (4)
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.022 0.020 0.011 0.001
(Transient Investors) (0.98) (0.90) (0.46) (0.02)
  
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.084*** 0.079***
(Non-transient Investors) (4.09) (4.07) (3.88) (3.66)
  
Same Specification as in Table IV Y Y Y Y
Chi-square Test: Difference in Coefficients 5.16** 5.38** 6.38** 6.93***
Number of Observations 15,813 15,813 15,813 15,813
 
 
  Panel C: Linkages from Grey and Independent Blockholders 
Dep. Var.: Forced Turnover Dummy (1) (2) (3) (4)
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.022 0.021 0.019 0.016
(Grey Investors) (1.09) (1.05) (0.93) (0.76)
  
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.083*** 0.084*** 0.079*** 0.072***
(Independent Investors) (3.97) (3.93) (3.62) (3.29)
  
Same Specification as in Table IV Y Y Y Y
Chi-square Test: Difference in Coefficients 5.09** 5.26** 4.79** 4.13**
Number of Observations 15,813 15,813 15,813 15,813
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Table VIII 
Predicting Forced CEO Turnover: Excluding Other Linkage Channels 
 
In this table, we perform robustness checks to the previous results on forced CEO turnovers, and consider 
specifications that help to rule-out alternative linkage channels. We repeat all of the previous analyses 
with the same specifications as in Table IV. For brevity we only report the variables of interests. We 
always report the conditional marginal effect of powerful blockholder linkage, as the ratio of the increase 
in CEO turnover probability due to one standard deviation increase in powerful blockholder linkage 
divided by the predicted probability. 
      In Panel A, we exclude the interlocking board channel. We use the data on firm directors from the 
IRRC Risk Metrics database from 1996 to 2010. We exclude all of the sample firms that have one or more 
common directors with the firms with forced CEO turnovers in the year when we construct the powerful 
blockholder linkage measure. 
      In Panel B, we exclude the industry linkage channel. We only identify powerful blockholders of firms 
from different industries (different 1-digit SIC code) with respect to the sample firms when we construct 
the powerful blockholder linkage.  
       In Panel C, exclude the regional linkage channel. We only identify powerful blockholders of firms 
located in different regions with respect to the sample firms when we construct the powerful blockholder 
linkage. We identify the locations of firms by ten regions: New England (Maine, New Hampshire, 
Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut), Middle Atlantic (New York, Pennsylvania, New 
Jersey), East North Central (Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio), West North Central (Missouri, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa), South Atlantic (Delaware, Maryland, 
Washington D.C., Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida), East South 
Central (Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama), West South Central (Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, 
Louisiana), Rocky Mountain (Montana, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico), 
Northwest (Oregon, Washington, Idaho) and California.  
       In Panel D, we exclude the supply chain channel. We perform the analyses by excluding the sample 
firms whose suppliers or customers have been subject to forced CEO turnovers in the year when we 
construct the powerful blockholder linkage measure. We identify the supply chain relationship using the 
Compustat Customer Segments data.  
       In Panel E, we exclude the historical CEO turnover channel. We perform the analyses only based on 
firms that that do not have forced CEO turnovers in the previous five years. ***, ** and * represent 
significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, using robust standard errors with t-statistics given in 
parentheses. 
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Table VIII (Continued) 
 
Dep. Var.: Forced Turnover Dummy 
 
Panel A: Excluding Interlock Board Channel (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.425*** 0.437*** 0.449*** 0.423***
 (3.96) (4.09) (4.01) (3.69)
 
Same Specification as in Table IV Y Y Y Y
Conditional Marginal Effects 26%*** 27%*** 29%*** 28%***
Number of Observations 10,544 10,544 10,544 10,544
Panel B: Excluding Industry Channel (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.308*** 0.312*** 0.315*** 0.289***
 (3.82) (3.83) (3.79) (3.47)
 
Same Specification as in Table IV Y Y Y Y
Conditional Marginal Effects 19%*** 19%*** 20%*** 19%***
Number of Observations 16,385 16,385 16,385 16,385
Panel C: Excluding Regional Channel (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.323*** 0.322*** 0.299*** 0.274***
 (4.06) (3.99) (3.60) (3.25)
 
Same Specification as in Table IV Y Y Y Y
Conditional Marginal Effects 20%*** 20%*** 19%*** 18%***
Number of Observations 16,129 16,129 16,129 16,129
Panel D: Excluding Supply Chain Channel (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.345*** 0.346*** 0.318*** 0.295***
 (4.25) (4.20) (3.77) (3.47)
 
Same Specification as in Table IV Y Y Y Y
Conditional Marginal Effects 21%*** 21%*** 20%*** 19%***
Number of Observations 16,195 16,195 16,195 16,195
Panel E: Excluding Forced History Channel (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.330*** 0.335*** 0.310*** 0.292***
 (3.92) (3.92) (3.54) (3.30)
 
Same Specification as in Table IV Y Y Y Y
Conditional Marginal Effects 20%*** 21%*** 20%*** 19%***
Number of Observations 15,127 15,127 15,127 15,127
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Table IX 
Predicting Forced CEO Turnover: Alternative Measures 
 
In this table, we perform additional robustness checks to the previous results on forced CEO turnovers, 
using alternative measures of powerful blockholder linkage. We repeat all of the previous analyses with the 
same specifications as in Table IV and for brevity we only report the variables of interests. We always 
report the conditional marginal effect of powerful blockholder linkage, as the ratio of the increase in CEO 
turnover probability due to one standard deviation increase in powerful blockholder linkage divided by the 
predicted probability. 
      In Panel A, we follow the same procedure as before to calculate the measure of powerful blockholder 
linkage, but focus on the top 5 institutional investors of each firm ranked by the amount of holdings of the 
company’s common stock. In Panel B, we follow the same procedure as before to calculate the measure of 
powerful blockholder linkage, but identify an investor as a block holder if its ownership is above 1 percent 
of the firm’s share outstanding. In Panel C, we still define blockholder by the 5 percent criteria. However, 
we identify an investor as the powerful blockholder if the fraction of holdings of stocks with forced CEO 
turnovers in its portfolio is above the sample median fraction. In Panel D, we still define blockholder by 
the 5 percent criteria. However, we identify an investor as the powerful blockholder if the fraction of 
holdings of stocks with forced CEO turnovers in its portfolio is above the bottom quintile fraction.  
 
Dep. Var.: Forced Turnover Dummy 
 
Panel A: Top 5 Institutional Investors (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.486*** 0.479*** 0.431*** 0.403***
 (3.87) (3.86) (3.40) (3.13)
 
Same Specification as in Table IV Y Y Y Y
Conditional Marginal Effects 22%*** 21%*** 20%*** 19%***
Number of Observations 17,950 17,950 17,950 17,950
Panel B: Blockholders (ownership>1%) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.535*** 0.532*** 0.471*** 0.426***
 (3.42) (3.46) (3.03) (2.72)
 
Same Specification as in Table IV Y Y Y Y
Conditional Marginal Effects 23%*** 23%*** 21%*** 19%***
Number of Observations 17,950 17,950 17,950 17,950
Panel C: Alternative Cutoff (median) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.399*** 0.381*** 0.343*** 0.321***
 (3.63) (3.43) (2.95) (2.71)
 
Same Specification as in Table IV Y Y Y Y
Conditional Marginal Effects 16%*** 15%*** 14%*** 14%***
Number of Observations 16,385 16,385 16,385 16,385
Panel D: Alternative Cutoff (1st quintile) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.224*** 0.229*** 0.201*** 0.180**
 (3.26) (3.27) (2.83) (2.51)
 
Same Specification as in Table IV Y Y Y Y
Conditional Marginal Effects 17%*** 18%*** 16%*** 14%**
Number of Observations 16,385 16,385 16,385 16,385
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Table X 
Predicting Forced CEO Turnover: Additional Controls 
 
In this table, we examine the relation between powerful blockholder linkage and the probability of future 
forced CEO turnovers with additional controls. 
      In Panel A, we include additional controls on board characteristics and other corporate governance 
characteristics. Columns (1)-(2) are based on the main measure used in Table IV. Columns (3) and (4) are 
based on alternative measures of powerful blockholder linkage, with blockholders identified by whether the 
investor holds more than 1% of the shares outstanding, or is one of the top 5 institutional investors ranked 
by the amount of holdings of the company’s common stock, respectively. All the independent 
variables are taken in year t. Year and industry fixed effects at the two-digit SIC level are included in all 
specifications. For each column, we report the model-based predicted probability at the mean. We also 
calculate the conditional marginal effect of powerful blockholder linkage, as the ratio of the increase in 
CEO turnover probability due to one standard deviation increase in powerful blockholder linkage divided 
by the predicted probability.  
      In Panel B, we control for blockholder concentration and blockholder busyness. For every firm, we 
define blockholder concentration as the Herfindahl index of ownerships among the institutional 
blockholders that hold the firm’s stock. We define blockholder busyness as the logarithm of the holdings-
weighted number of block-owned stocks across the institutional blockholders that hold the firm’s stock. 
We repeat all of the previous analyses with the same specifications as in Table IV. For brevity we only 
report the variables of interests. ***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively, using robust standard errors with t-statistics given in parentheses. 
 
 Panel A: Control for Board Characteristics and Other Governance Characteristics 
Dep. Var.: Forced Turnover Dummy Main Measure Top 5
Inst. Investors 
Blockholder 
Ownership>1% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.282*** 0.282*** 0.419** 0.576***
 (2.64) (2.64) (2.56) (2.69)
Controls 
CEO Tenure -0.017 -0.016 -0.020 -0.017
 (-0.36) (-0.34) (-0.45) (-0.37)
CEO Age -0.302 -0.300 -0.137 -0.152
 (-1.10) (-1.09) (-0.52) (-0.57)
Chairman -0.123** -0.125** -0.171*** -0.172***
 (-1.96) (-2.01) (-2.80) (-2.80)
Founder -0.191** -0.192** -0.204** -0.195**
 (-2.16) (-2.16) (-2.36) (-2.25)
CEO Ownership -3.062* -3.021* -1.855 -1.909
 (-1.70) (-1.69) (-1.43) (-1.47)
Block Inst. Ownership 0.257 0.252 0.273 0.119
 (1.00) (0.98) (0.86) (0.59)
Other Inst. Ownership -0.043 -0.051 -0.087 -0.868*
 (-0.16) (-0.19) (-0.32) (-1.72)
Change in Block Inst. Ownership 0.458 0.456 1.428** 0.601
 (1.04) (1.04) (2.55) (1.43)
Change in Other Inst. Ownership 0.245 0.246 0.164 -0.554
 (0.56) (0.56) (0.36) (-0.76)
Firm Size 0.040 0.039 0.048* 0.062**
 (1.32) (1.29) (1.67) (2.02)
Book Leverage 0.249 0.246 0.168 0.136
 (1.43) (1.42) (1.00) (0.82)
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Market-to-Book -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 0.002
 (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.13) (0.08)
Profitability -0.456 -0.454 -0.433 -0.323
 (-1.27) (-1.27) (-1.31) (-0.98)
Stock Return -0.304*** -0.304*** -0.296*** -0.290***
 (-3.82) (-3.82) (-3.92) (-3.80)
Return Volatility 13.508*** 13.472*** 15.158*** 15.118***
 (4.37) (4.36) (5.04) (5.05)
Amihud Illiquidity -0.138 -0.148 -0.229 -0.425
 (-0.33) (-0.35) (-0.53) (-0.98)
Staggered Board Dummy 0.081 0.086 0.088 0.090
 (1.17) (1.20) (1.27) (1.30)
Board Size 0.077 0.079 0.074 0.076
 (0.56) (0.57) (0.55) (0.57)
Board Age -0.334 -0.326 -0.328 -0.362
 (-0.87) (-0.85) (-0.87) (-0.95)
Busy Board Dummy 0.055 0.056 0.054 0.052
 (0.87) (0.88) (0.86) (0.83)
Affiliated Board Members (%) -0.147 -0.150 -0.201 -0.181
 (-0.61) (-0.63) (-0.88) (-0.79)
Insider Board Members (%) -0.411 -0.402 -0.641** -0.630**
 (-1.33) (-1.31) (-2.08) (-2.05)
Supermajority Dummy -0.044 -0.035 -0.033
 (-0.52) (-0.43) (-0.40)
Poison Pill Dummy -0.019 -0.033 -0.029
 (-0.31) (-0.53) (-0.48)
Golden Parachute Dummy 0.035 0.053 0.058
 (0.54) (0.84) (0.90)
 
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y
Clustering Firm Firm Firm Firm
Number of Observations 10,024 10,024 10,741 10,741
Conditional Marginal Effects 19% 19% 21% 26%
 
 
  Panel B: Control for Blockholder Concentration and Blockholder Busyness 
Dep. Var.: Forced Turnover Dummy (1) (2) (3) (4)
  
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.371*** 0.355*** 0.327*** 0.308***
 (4.26) (4.08) (3.69) (3.46)
  
Blockholder Concentration -0.232** -0.343*** -0.294** -0.337**
 (-2.55) (-2.77) (-2.25) (-2.49)
Blockholder Busyness -0.027 -0.018 -0.015 -0.016
 (-1.24) (-0.84) (-0.67) (-0.69)
  
Same Specification as in Table IV Y Y Y Y
Number of Observations 16,385 16,385 16,385 16,385
Conditional Marginal Effects 23% 22% 21% 20%
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Table XI 
Powerful Blockholder Linkage and Other Governance Outcomes 
 
In this table, we examine the relation between powerful blockholder linkage and other commonly used 
corporate governance outcomes in the literature. Specifically, we focus on the CEO turnover-performance 
sensitivity, the bidder announcement returns in mergers and the Tobin’s Q. 
       In Panel A, we focus on the CEO turnover and firm performance sensitivity. The dependent variable 
is the forced CEO turnover dummy. We split the full sample into two subsamples by the median value of 
powerful blockholder linkage. Our focus is on the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover on stock returns. For 
the convenience of  comparsion, we standardize the stock returns in the previous year to have a mean of 0 
and a standard deviation of 1. We also report the marginal effects of the probit regressions. Columns (1) 
and (2) are based on the subsample with powerful blockholder linkage above sample median, while 
columns (3)-(4) are based on the subsample with powerful blockholder linkage below the sample median.   
       In Panel B, we focus on the bidder announcement returns, and estimate the following model: 
, 1 , , , 1Bidder CAR ( 1,  1) Powerful Blockhoder Linkagei t i t i t i tX            , 
where the dependent variable is the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns of the bidder around the merger 
announcement date in year t+1. We use the market model to estimate the abnormal returns with window 
(-300, -46) before the announcement date as the estimation period. We obtain the data on mergers from 
SDC Platinum’s M&A database for the period of 1994 to 2010. We require the deal value to be more than 
50 million dollars. We always control for major deal characteristics: Deal Value, as the logarithm of the 
dollar value of the merger; Tender Offer Dummy, as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the merger is a tender 
offer and 0 otherwise; Cash Offer Dummy, as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the method of payment is 
only by cash and 0 otherwise; Same Industry Dummy, as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target and 
the bidder have the same two-digit SIC industry code. We always cluster the errors at the year level. All 
the independent variables are taken in year t.  
     In Panel C, we examine the relation between powerful blockholder linkage and firm value in the next 
year. Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
, 1 , , , 1Tobin's Q Powerful Blockhoder Linkagei t i t i t i tX          , 
where the dependent variable is the Tobin’s Q (market-to-book ratio) at the end of year t+1. Columns 
(1)-(2) are based on the full sample while in columns (3)-(4) we exclude the firms with forced CEO 
turnover in year t+1. We always cluster the errors at the firm level. All the independent variables are 
taken in year t. ***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, using robust 
standard errors with t-statistics given in parentheses. 
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Table XI (Continued) 
 
    Panel A: CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity (Marginal Effects) 
Dep. Var.: Forced Turnover Dummy Power Blockholder Linkage
(above sample median) 
Power Blockholder Linkage
(below sample median) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Stock Return (Standardized) -0.015*** -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.005***
 (-4.75) (-4.59) (-3.08) (-3.10)
Controls 
CEO Tenure -0.003 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000
 (-1.16) (-0.83) (-0.27) (-0.08)
CEO Age -0.040*** -0.024** -0.018* -0.004
 (-3.31) (-2.31) (-1.68) (-0.47)
Chairman -0.004 -0.004 -0.005* -0.004
 (-1.19) (-1.35) (-1.66) (-1.56)
Founder -0.007* -0.007** -0.011*** -0.012***
 (-1.68) (-1.98) (-3.22) (-3.61)
CEO Ownership -0.128** -0.107** -0.061* -0.058*
 (-2.55) (-2.46) (-1.74) (-1.75)
Block Inst. Ownership 0.006 0.006 -0.004 -0.008
 (0.45) (0.53) (-0.37) (-0.87)
Other Inst. Ownership -0.011 0.007 -0.027*** -0.021**
 (-0.96) (0.58) (-2.78) (-2.45)
Change in Block Inst. Ownership 0.005 0.018 -0.025 -0.014
 (0.24) (1.03) (-1.41) (-1.07)
Change in Other Inst. Ownership 0.001 0.013 -0.024 -0.010
 (0.03) (0.81) (-1.19) (-0.70)
Firm Size 0.001 0.001
 (1.09) (1.24)
Book Leverage 0.008 0.004
 (1.00) (0.55)
Market-to-Book -0.001 -0.000
 (-0.83) (-0.91)
Profitability -0.011 -0.000
 (-0.84) (-0.14)
Return Volatility 0.520*** 0.400***
 (4.62) (4.09)
Amihud Illiquidity 0.013 -0.000
 (0.81) (-0.03)
 
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Industry FE (2-digit SIC) - Y - Y
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm
Number of Observations 8,193 8,193 8,192 8,192
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Table XI (Continued) 
    
   Panel B: Bidder Announcement Returns in Mergers 
Dep. Var.: Bidder CAR (-1,+1) Full Sample No Forced CEO Turnover
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
  
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.019***
 (3.26) (3.17) (3.72) (3.57)
Controls  
Deal Value -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
 (-5.00) (-5.17) (-5.59) (-5.55)
Tender Offer Dummy 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
 (0.35) (0.39) (0.53) (0.61)
Cash Offer Dummy 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014***
 (4.84) (4.21) (4.70) (4.05)
Same Industry Dummy 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
 (0.36) (0.35) (0.24) (0.22)
CEO Tenure 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
 (0.92) (0.81) (1.55) (1.49)
CEO Age 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.023
 (1.60) (1.49) (1.55) (1.51)
Chairman 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000
 (0.70) (0.49) (0.25) (0.03)
Founder 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.003
 (0.55) (0.81) (0.23) (0.45)
CEO Ownership 0.017 0.016 0.030 0.029
 (0.51) (0.46) (0.89) (0.83)
Block Inst. Ownership 0.020 0.017 0.015 0.012
 (1.27) (1.12) (0.93) (0.80)
Other Inst. Ownership 0.018 0.016 0.022 0.022
 (1.38) (1.17) (1.61) (1.48)
Change in Block Inst. Ownership 0.032 0.030 0.038 0.037
 (1.06) (1.03) (1.27) (1.27)
Change in Other Inst. Ownership 0.011 -0.003 0.011 -0.006
 (0.31) (-0.07) (0.29) (-0.15)
Firm Size -0.002 -0.002 -0.003* -0.002
 (-1.72) (-1.74) (-1.85) (-1.59)
Book Leverage 0.017* 0.014 0.021* 0.018
 (2.02) (1.62) (2.08) (1.73)
Market-to-Book 0.001** 0.001* 0.001** 0.001*
 (2.53) (1.92) (2.55) (1.92)
Profitability 0.040*** 0.037** 0.038*** 0.035**
 (3.27) (2.78) (3.18) (2.64)
Stock Return 0.007** 0.008***
 (2.59) (3.47)
Return Volatility -0.391 -0.370
 (-1.28) (-1.17)
Amihud Illiquidity 0.031 0.050
 (0.56) (0.87)
  
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Industry FE (2-digit SIC) Y Y Y Y
Cluster Year Year Year Year
R-squared 0.142 0.150 0.152 0.161
Number of Observations 1,309 1,309 1,282 1,282
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Table XI (Continued) 
 
    Panel C: Firm Value 
Dep. Var.: Tobin’s Q Full Sample No Forced CEO Turnover
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
  
Powerful Blockholder Linkage 0.076** 0.097*** 0.084** 0.106***
 (2.29) (2.97) (2.50) (3.18)
Controls  
CEO Tenure 0.006 0.010 0.006 0.009
 (0.41) (0.62) (0.36) (0.56)
CEO Age -0.314*** -0.242** -0.319*** -0.250**
 (-2.92) (-2.45) (-2.91) (-2.49)
Chairman -0.036 -0.037 -0.038 -0.039
 (-1.40) (-1.47) (-1.48) (-1.54)
Founder 0.055* 0.032 0.057* 0.033
 (1.83) (1.12) (1.86) (1.16)
CEO Ownership 0.257 0.219 0.255 0.216
 (1.25) (1.08) (1.22) (1.05)
Block Inst. Ownership -0.237** -0.295*** -0.235** -0.298***
 (-2.20) (-2.79) (-2.15) (-2.76)
Other Inst. Ownership 0.308*** -0.134 0.315*** -0.136
 (2.97) (-1.37) (3.00) (-1.37)
Change in Block Inst. Ownership -0.157 -0.219** -0.136 -0.197*
 (-1.53) (-2.10) (-1.29) (-1.85)
Change in Other Inst. Ownership 0.005 -0.108 0.020 -0.093
 (0.04) (-0.99) (0.17) (-0.83)
Firm Size -0.067*** -0.109*** -0.069*** -0.112***
 (-5.11) (-6.58) (-5.23) (-6.72)
Book Leverage -0.436*** -0.367*** -0.444*** -0.374***
 (-4.56) (-4.14) (-4.58) (-4.16)
Market-to-Book 0.293*** 0.275*** 0.289*** 0.272***
 (5.39) (4.75) (5.32) (4.69)
Profitability 2.273*** 2.244*** 2.303*** 2.272***
 (7.30) (7.20) (7.28) (7.17)
Stock Return 0.036 0.034
 (0.84) (0.80)
Return Volatility 2.015 1.981
 (1.19) (1.14)
Amihud Illiquidity -1.567*** -1.593***
 (-6.05) (-6.08)
  
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE (2-digit SIC) - - Y Y 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm
R-squared 0.480 0.488 0.480 0.488
Number of Observations 14,603 14,603 14,251 14,251
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Table XII 
“Placebo” Tests: Blockholder Linkage with Voluntary CEO Turnovers 
 
In this table, we provide some placebo tests using a measure of blockholder linkage with other firms that 
have voluntary CEO turnovers. We follow the same procedure as previously used when we construct the 
powerful blockholder linkage. However, instead of linking with firms with forced CEO turnovers, we now 
calculate the linkage measure using voluntary CEO turnovers. From Panel A to Panel E, we examine the 
forced CEO turnover, voluntary CEO turnover, bidder announcement return, CEO turnover-performance 
sensitivity and firm value, respectively. We repeat the previous analyses with the same specifications and 
for brevity we only report the variables of interests. 
  Panel A: Forced CEO Turnover 
Dep. Var.: Forced Turnover Dummy (1) (2) (3) (4)
Blockholder Linkage -0.146* -0.127 -0.155* -0.155*
(From Voluntary CEO Turnovers) (-1.81) (-1.56) (-1.85) (-1.82)
  
Same Specification as in Table IV Y Y Y Y
 
  Panel B: Voluntary CEO Turnover 
Dep. Var.: Voluntary Turnover Dummy (1) (2) (3) (4)
Blockholder Linkage 0.028 0.023 0.017 0.023
(From Voluntary CEO Turnovers) (0.37) (0.31) (0.23) (0.30)
  
Same Specification as in Table V Y Y Y Y
 
  Panel C: CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity (Marginal Effects) 
Dep. Var.: Forced Turnover Dummy Blockholder Linkage
(above sample median) 
Blockholder Linkage
(below sample median) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Stock Return (Standardized) -0.012*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.007***
 (-4.09) (-3.88) (-3.54) (-3.93)
 
Same Specification as in Table XI, Panel A Y Y Y Y
 
  Panel D: Bidder Announcement Returns 
Dep. Var.: Bidder CAR (-1, +1) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Blockholder Linkage 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(From Voluntary CEO Turnovers) (0.22) (0.08) (0.19) (0.01)
  
Same Specification as in Table XI, Panel B Y Y Y Y
 
   Panel E: Firm Value 
Dep. Var.: Tobin’s Q (1) (2) (3) (4)
Blockholder Linkage -0.038 -0.034 -0.035 -0.032
(From Voluntary CEO Turnovers) (-1.13) (-1.05) (-1.06) (-0.97)
 
Same Specification as in Table XI, Panel C Y Y Y Y
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Internet Appendix 
Examples of Powerful Institutional Blockholders 
(Ranked by Fraction of Holdings in Forced CEO Turnover Stocks) 
 
In this table, we provide a list of examples of powerful institutional blockholders ranked by their median 
fraction in holdings in forced CEO turnover stocks across the sample period. We require the number of 
stocks under blockholding to be above 10. We report the names of institutional investors, their identifiers 
from Thomson database, the size of total holdings, and the number of sample stocks under blockholding. 
 
Name of Institutional Investor MGRNO 
Number 
( Identifier) 
Size of Portfolio
Holdings in $millions 
(Median) 
Fraction of 
Forced CEO 
Turnover Stocks 
(Median) 
Number of 
Stocks under 
Blockholding 
(Median) 
  
Nicholas-Applegate Cap 64240 1077.46 35.4% 15
Primecap Mgmt Company 71200 2134.09 30.6% 11
Clearbridge Advr 12058 4965.36 29.9% 11
Southeastern Asset Mgmt 79600 20165.29 28.8% 15
Denver Invt Advisors Llc 22860 1133.79 25.7% 10
Marsico Capital Mgmt, Llc 54314 27013.25 23.4% 14
American Express Finl Advr 45639 2903.42 21.8% 15
Janus Capital Corp 48170 15451.98 20.5% 19
Invesco Capital Mgmt Inc. 47400 4145.61 19.4% 19
Baron Capital Inc 8000 5017.44 19.1% 15
Shapiro Capital Mgmt Co 78542 1167.15 18.4% 10
Equitable Companies Inc 25610 55068.61 18.1% 48
State Of WI Investment Board 93405 2731.09 17.7% 25
Blackrock Investment Mgmt 39539 1053.28 17.7% 20
Geocapital Corporation 41000 755.69 17.1% 14
Travelers Inc 84900 3236.77 17.0% 13
Legg Mason Capital Mgmt, Inc 50130 11441.89 15.9% 15
Barrow, Hanley, Mewhinney 8100 8976.92 15.8% 16
Massachusetts Finl Serv Co 54600 13444.19 15.4% 39
Allianz Dresdner Asset Mgmt 70470 3383.86 14.8% 26
Legg Mason Fund Advisors, Inc 50160 4676.23 14.7% 12
Heine Securities Corp 44438 2099.82 14.6% 13
Blackrock Advisors, Llc 11386 1166.57 14.1% 12
Scudder Kemper Invts, Inc 76960 6707.08 13.5% 24
ICM Asset Management Inc 45620 492.54 13.3% 15
Goldman Sachs & Company 41260 12113.63 13.2% 25
Artisan Ptnr L.P. 4719 2065.83 13.1% 17
Berkshire Hathaway Inc 8350 30419.01 13.0% 12
Fleet Boston Corporation 38260 860.09 12.8% 14
Heartland Advr Inc. 44434 1460.00 12.6% 12
Wachovia Corporation 37700 2267.63 12.4% 21
Brandes Invt Partners, L.P. 10005 3086.32 11.8% 11
Ariel Investments, Llc 4690 1513.24 11.6% 14
Manning & Napier Advisors Inc 53300 1101.37 11.5% 11
Gendell Jeffrey L 40175 5328.09 11.0% 20
RS Investments 74530 2580.30 10.7% 17
JP Morgan & Company Inc 58835 5996.83 10.6% 16
Neuberger&Berman Mgmt 63060 2219.25 10.6% 13
Rutabaga Capital Mgmt Llc 75095 486.90 10.5% 11
Sterling Capital Mgmt, Llc 81900 893.37 10.3% 11
 
